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ABSTRACT 
 
LEVINE, ILAN Remembering the Holocaust and the Killing Fields: A 
Comparative Study. Department of History, March 2016. 
 
ADVISOR: Mark Walker, Ph.D. 
 
 Why is the Holocaust almost universally remembered as the most horrific event in 
the modern age while the Cambodian genocide is hardly remembered both in and outside 
of Cambodia? Do the two events share similar aspects despite their differences, and what 
implication does that have on a wider understanding of both genocides? This thesis 
explores these questions by examining how the Holocaust and Cambodian genocide 
(killing fields) have been remembered over time. Examining both shows the respective 
roads of memorialization that each have taken and reveals where the two catastrophes 
share major aspects: notably, the tactics used by the perpetrators, the world’s failure to 
act, and the initial forced memorialization by third parties followed by a period of silence 
in the perpetrators and victims. This analysis focuses on three groups: the victims, the 
perpetrators, and third party countries – mainly America and Vietnam. The first two 
chapters focus on each genocide respectively by outlining how they have been 
remembered and what factors shaped, influenced, and hindered the process of 
memorialization. The third chapter compares and contrasts the two genocides, focusing 
on major similarities and differences between the two starkly different events.  
Examining the first four decades of Holocaust remembrance shows how its 
memorialization has become established. Focusing mostly on Jewish and German 
commemoration and how third party memorialization has affected this remembrance can 
reveal this process of establishment. Doing this reveals a deep struggle of Holocaust 
memory and an initial ignorance of world powers in recognizing the Jewish calamity 
	   ii	  
within the context of the Second World War. Today, this can come as a surprise because 
the Holocaust is widely remembered and adapted into the narratives of many countries. 
Without studying the historiography of the Holocaust, one might assume that it was 
always openly and globally commemorated. However, this was not the case before the 
Israeli trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. It took Israel – the new Jewish state – to adapt 
the catastrophe into a suitable narrative, before the Holocaust became a publicly 
discussed topic anywhere else. This is the key reason why the Holocaust has been able to 
enter the realm of public commemoration while the Cambodian genocide has not – 
Cambodians do not have a separate state unlike world Jewry, which has Israel. Even so, 
the past struggles persist in Israeli and German narratives. Israel overemphasizes heroism 
in order to identify with the Holocaust; Germany has become torn between accepting past 
guilt and building a nation with a new image. Both of these elements have shaped how 
the Holocaust has been commemorated publicly in speeches, holidays, monuments, and 
museums.  
On the other hand, scholars interpret the Cambodian genocide differently amongst 
themselves. Some do not even consider the killing fields to be genocide while others 
label it another holocaust. It all depends on whether the focus is put on the numbers of 
those who were killed or on the actual experiences of the victims. Either way, even 
Cambodians struggle to remember their past. There are two significant causes for this. 
First, conflicting messages of peace and justice have prevented many Cambodians from 
knowing how to deal with their past – a struggle similar to the one Germany has 
experienced. Additionally, while the Holocaust ended for Jews after liberation, the 
Khmer Rouge continued to be a real threat to Cambodians for another 19 years. The 
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effects of this can be seen in the topic’s absence in schools and its constrained public 
commemoration within the Tuol Sleng museum and Choeung Ek Genocidal Center. This 
struggle has only recently seen some improvements with the beginning of an international 
tribunal that is bringing a sense of justice to Cambodians, while also promoting education 
and public discussion about the past.  
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Introduction 
I grew up as an Americanized Jew with a private Jewish school education and 
first became interested in genocide studies several years ago when I participated in a 
program in 2010 that visited many of the death and concentration camps in Poland. The 
Holocaust was an underlying subject in my studies, and it was often used to reinforce the 
Zionist agenda that my schools preached to us students. I was raised with the 
understanding that my people had undergone the worst treatment by humanity and that it 
was imperative that I grow up remembering who I am and having a strong Jewish 
identity. This would ensure that something like the Holocaust would never happen again. 
This was the only genocide that I was taught about in school, and any other historical 
catastrophes were secondary to it. Then, in the spring of 2015, I was fortunate enough to 
study abroad in Cambodia with four other students. As we prepared for our departure, we 
read, watched, and discussed what had happened under the Khmer Rouge. For the first 
time in my life, I realized that Jews were not the only people who had such a deep 
connection to catastrophe. What the Holocaust was to me was what the Cambodian 
genocide was to young Cambodians of my same generation. During my 3-month stay in 
Cambodia, I was able to talk to survivors, teach the second and third generation of 
victims, visit the central places of death, and reflect on my own identity. What shocked 
me most was that the genocide seemed to be the cause of all of Cambodia’s current socio-
economic and political problems, but hardly any locals would openly talk about it. I was 
constantly surrounded by Cambodia’s dark past, but could only confront it when I was 
inside places like the Tuol Sleng Museum or the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center. It was 
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only in these places that I did not get an uncomfortable vibe from Cambodians while 
discussing their past.  
I left Cambodia with so many questions: Why did they deal with their past so 
much differently than Jews? Why does what happened continue to haunt Cambodians 
while the Holocaust seems to unify world Jewry? How could the world let genocide 
happen again after the Holocaust? I left with the impression that Cambodia represented 
what dealing with the Holocaust was like when it was still relatively recent history, but I 
knew it was not exactly the same. When I returned from Cambodia it was time for me to 
pick a topic for my thesis. It felt natural to study these two genocides in more depth, and I 
thought it would be productive to compare and contrast how they have been remembered 
and commemorated over time. This thesis argues that while the Holocaust and 
Cambodian genocide are starkly different events in history, striking similarities arise 
when comparing them. The victims and perpetrators of both genocides encountered initial 
difficulty with memorializing the catastrophes because both felt shame, which was 
matched with a desire to digest what had happened. At the same time, foreign powers 
influenced memory while occupying Germany and Cambodia, which affected the natural 
development of memorialization. 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 is a historiographical narrative 
of the first four decades of Holocaust remembrance starting with the international 
Nuremberg War Crimes trial in 1945-1946 and ending in the late 80s. Four significant 
groups who remember the Holocaust are analyzed: Jewish victims, Jewish non-victims, 
Germans, and the Allied powers. However, there is a particular emphasis on the first 
three groups. Within the first four decades, the Holocaust went from being a neglected 
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topic in public life to being the prime example of genocide today. I argue, agreeing with 
many Holocaust scholars, that the turning point for this was Israel’s capture and trial of 
Adolf Eichmann in 1961. Before this event, Israelis struggled to incorporate the 
destruction of six million Jews into their image of Jewish strength. It took the Eichmann 
trial to change this, and its global coverage prompted public commemoration – especially 
in West Germany. Yet, a struggle formed within Germany to incorporate the Holocaust 
into public life after the Eichmann trial. Events like the Historian’s Debate, the 1985 
celebration of the anniversary of the end of the Third Reich, and the construction of 
various monuments reveal the difficulty Germans had between remembering past 
perpetration and moving forward as a newborn nation. 
 Chapter 2 is a historiographical narrative of how the Cambodian genocide has 
been remembered and commemorated over time. This genocide took place much more 
recently compared to the Holocaust, and so the analysis covers from the time leading up 
to the genocide up until very recently. More of the actual genocide must be covered 
because more explanation of Cambodian culture and the Khmer Rouge period are 
necessary; the Killing Fields are much more foreign to the western reader than the 
Holocaust. For example, the overwhelming majority of westerners know that six million 
Jews died in the Holocaust, but it is not common knowledge that roughly 3 million 
Khmer were killed during the Khmer Rouge. It is also noteworthy to examine what 
scholars consider the killing fields to be; some argue that what happened in Cambodia 
was not technically genocide, while others consider it another holocaust. I highlight a few 
reasons why Cambodians struggle to remember the genocide: their culture promotes anti-
memory, they are ashamed of their experience, and they are torn between two narratives 
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of extracting justice and moving forward as a unified nation. The recent introduction of 
the subject in schools and the slow progress of the international tribunals have brought 
memorialization to a new phase, but it is still unclear what effects these two events will 
have on the larger picture of remembrance. 
The third and final chapter conducts an in-depth comparison of the two genocides 
by identifying major themes. It starts by comparing the two genocides as events and then 
examines them in the context of how they have been memorialized and commemorated. 
While logistically the two are so starkly different – mainly Nazi persecution was race-
based while the Khmer Rouge fight was class-based – both groups of perpetrators used 
rhetoric, secrecy, and discipline to distort preexisting cultural beliefs and to create an 
environment that encouraged the persecution of a group of people. Also analogous was 
the ineffective way that the world reacted to both situations as they escalated into 
genocide. There are some major similarities and one key difference in how the genocides 
have been remembered. Both the Holocaust and the Cambodian genocide experienced a 
period of silence from the victims and perpetrators, and both also have been influenced 
by foreign powers to adopt a certain narrative. The key difference lies in the distinction 
between Jews and Khmer; the Jews are a global people while Khmer live in Cambodia. 
Once Israeli Jews adopted the Holocaust and brought justice on behalf of all Jews 
through the Eichmann trial, the event started to become heavily commemorated publicly. 
I argue that this is a significant reason why the Holocaust has become the icon of 
genocide whereas the killing fields are hardly remembered.  
I began my research by reading about the how the Holocaust is dealt with in 
memory. The first book I picked up was Dominick LaCapra’s History & Memory after 
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Auschwitz. LaCapra’s central thesis argued that what made the Holocaust unique was that 
a line was crossed, but “whenever that threshold or limit is crossed, something ‘unique’ 
happens.”1 This meant that any genocide is considered unique as long as the threshold is 
set to incorporate all genocides. I kept that message in the back of my mind as I 
continued my research. The idea that the Holocaust is unique in the same sense that any 
awful catastrophe is unique was an exceptional challenge to the notion that the Holocaust 
is set at a level above all other genocides. LaCapra’s thesis levels the two catastrophes 
while also affirming that they are both indeed unique. After I did some preliminary 
research on the Holocaust in memory, I switched over to studying the Cambodian 
genocide. I started with the chapter on Cambodia because the amount of accessible 
research on the Holocaust was enormous in comparison. This forced me to approach each 
chapter in a very different way. The biggest challenge in writing the Holocaust chapter 
was choosing what to include and what was not central enough to discuss. On the other 
hand, the biggest challenge with the Cambodian chapter was finding enough primary 
sources in order to make a meaningful comparison. Both obstacles forced me to think in 
different ways, which I believe has resulted in an instructive comparison of the two 
events.   	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dominick LaCapra, History And Memory After Auschwitz (London, Cornell University Press, 
1998), 7. 
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The “First” Genocide: German and Jewish Holocaust Remembrance  
Today, perhaps more attention is paid to the Holocaust then to any human 
catastrophe in the modern age. The Holocaust is remembered globally. There are over 
250 museums and memorials, tens of thousands of books, and a massive genre in film 
dedicated to the death of six million European Jews.2 It has become the sacred example 
of genocide – an unprecedented and unequaled crime against humanity. However, this 
was not always the case. For the first decade and a half after liberation, the near 
annihilation of European Jewry was a lost focus in the context of the aftermath of the 
Second World War. In addition to this global negligence, Jews and Germans struggled 
with confronting the past; Israelis and Germans were focused on building a positive 
future for their newborn states, which left survivors to privately digest their stories. A 
complete reversal to this silence occurred with the Eichmann trial in 1961 when Israelis 
finally found a way to incorporate the Holocaust into their national identity.  
Two major themes are important in understanding this vast and complex topic. 
The first theme is the different narratives that each nation forms. The whole concept of a 
nation having to “fit” the Holocaust into memory shows how the event can be represented 
in a variety of ways depending on which angle is taken. The second theme is what James 
Young calls the “texture” to memory, which describes the diversity of opinions that are 
shared within a nation.3 It is important to recognize that nations form specific narratives 
on the Holocaust and that there are always other opinions and feelings that add depth to 
how it is understood. This is particularly evident in German memory in the 80s. The early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mark Weber, “Holocaust Remembrance: what’s behind the campaign?,” Institute for Historical 
Review, http://www.ihr.org/leaflets/holocaust_remembrance.shtml. 
3 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (London: Yale 
University Press, 1993), x. 
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foundation and formation of these different narratives took place over the first four 
decades of Holocaust memorialization, which is important to analyze because it was 
within this span of time that the Holocaust became the universal icon of hate and mass 
destruction that is today.  
 The beginning of Holocaust remembrance, between 1945 and 1960, is widely 
accepted by scholars of Holocaust studies as a time of neglect. There are many reasons 
for this belief. Immediately after the war the world was more focused on holding the 
Nazis accountable for the crimes that they committed against the Allies; the crimes 
against a bunch of nationless Jews took the back seat at the Nuremberg Trials. At the 
same time, Jewish victims seemed ashamed and embarrassed of what they went through 
while Jews who were not Holocaust victims were ashamed of their Jewish brethren for 
“allowing” themselves to be persecuted. Germans were ashamed of what they or their 
fellow Germans had done. This collective embarrassment was caused by two significant 
factors: the world’s inability to comprehend and truly understand what had happened, and 
the effect that trauma had on the victims and perpetrators. Most scholars of the Holocaust 
tell a narrative of neglect leading up to the Eichmann Trial of the 60’s. However, scholars 
have overgeneralized this neglect for silence. Neglect connotes a negative inaction while 
silence can be caused by multiple factors – positive and negative. Before analyzing this 
further, it is important to start at the beginning – the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials of 
1945-1946.  
There is a colloquial saying that the victors always write history; this is exactly 
what happened after Germany’s unconditional surrender. Immediately after the 
conclusion of the Second World War, the victorious Allies got together to discuss what 
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would be done with the German war criminals that were in their custody. The collective 
decision to hand these war criminals over to an international tribunal was, in itself, a 
historical first. The decision was reached due to a combination of factors, most of which 
played into the common sentiment to punish “an unprecedented crime” in an 
unprecedented manner.4 Furthermore, a trial would not simply be bringing the Nazi war 
criminals to justice, but it would also do so in a way that juxtaposed the crimes of the war 
criminals to their actions; these Nazis would get the trial that they never gave to the 
millions of people they murdered.  
The Allies’ determination to rain down justice upon the leaders of the Third Reich 
had little to do with the Nazis’ attempted extinction of European Jewry. The trial was 
really centered on reprimanding the Nazis for instigating aggressive warfare on the 
Allies. The crimes against the Jewish people, which were most elaborated upon in the 
fourth count, “Crimes Against Humanity,” took a secondary role in the trial and were 
used mainly for the purpose of reinforcing Nazi guilt. Out of the first three counts 
brought against the war criminals, the first two were focused on the Nazis’ aggressive 
warfare and the third was focused on the mistreatment of civilians – the European Jews 
received very little special attention.5 
The subject of Nazi massacre of Jews was pushed off the main stage of the trial 
for a combination of reasons that were political and anti-Semitic in nature, but was also 
due in large part to the general ignorance there was for what had actually happened. 
When French prosecutor, François De Menthon, devoted only one sentence to Jewish 
victimization in his “several hour” long speech charging the Nazis with crimes against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-1946: A Documented History 
(New York: Bedford Books, 1997), 1-2, 22-23. 
5 Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-1946, 57-70. 
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humanity, he did not do so simply because he forgot or because he did not know that 
there were large numbers of European Jews killed.6 Rather, Menthon neglected any real 
mention of Jewish massacre because, at the time, there was significant French unease 
over myths of Jews being Nazi collaborators, which was matched with a general anti-
Semitic French attitude.7 When American chief prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, proposed 
to bring Chiam Weizmann, then the President of the World Zionist Organization, to the 
trial as a witness, the British rejected Jackson’s proposal on the grounds that doing so 
would garner too much “sympathy for the Jews.” 8 After all, too much sympathy was 
undesirable with the politically sensitive Palestine Mandate at stake. The Allied 
governments had their own agendas in bringing the Nazi prisoners to justice; there was 
no reason to dwell on the fate of the Jews, especially when politics and anti-Semitic 
attitudes obscured the truth. 
Of course, politics and anti-Semitic fervor were only two reasons for not devoting 
an appropriate amount of attention to the Jewish victims. The trial was taking place in the 
immediate postwar period and much of what is known today about the Holocaust was not 
fully understood at the time. As one prosecutor confided in his memoir years after the 
trial: “like so many others, I remained ignorant of the mass extermination camps in 
Poland…”9 There was an enormous amount of evidence accumulated for the trial that 
would later be instrumental in understanding the scope of what the Nazis did to the Jews, 
but there was too much to digest in the short amount of time leading up to the trial. A 
great example of this knowledge gap was that at the time of the trial the prosecutors could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-1946, 190-192. 
7 Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-1946, 192. 
8 Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-1946, 192. 
9 Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-1946, 192-193. 
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not distinguish between concentration camps and the death camps in Poland.10 In fact, the 
term “genocide” was not even adopted into international law until after the trial; a Polish-
Jewish lawyer named Raphael Lemkin actually coined the word in 1944.11 There was 
much to learn about the fate of the 6 million European Jews. 
 Dominick LaCapra, begins in the first chapter of his book, History and Memory 
after Auschwitz, with a discussion on memory and the effects trauma has on repressing it. 
LaCapra explains that victims push traumatic events out of their memories and can only 
confront their experiences after  “the passage of a period of latency.”12 While this may be 
most prevalent for victims, LaCapra argues that it affects all who are connected to the 
traumatic event, even bystanders and later generations.13 Evidence of this can be seen in 
memoirs from Holocaust survivors, but also in the lack of public discussion about the fate 
of the European Jews. Scholar and survivor, Primo Levi, refers to an overwhelming sense 
of shame that he felt on the eve of liberation in his memoir, Survival in Auschwitz. Levi 
tells the reader how he was “oppressed by shame,” when the SS hanged the last man with 
courage in the camp:  
Alberto and I went back to the hut, and we could not look each other in the 
face… Because we also are broken, conquered: even if we know how to 
adapt ourselves, even if we have finally learnt how to find our food and to 
resist the fatigue and cold, even if we return home.14 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-1946, 193-194. 
11 William A. Schabas, introductory note, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide,” in Audiovisual Library of International Law, 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cppcg/cppcg.html. 
12 Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (London: Cornell University Press, 
1998), 8-9. 
13 LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz, 8-9. 
14 Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz: the Nazi assault on humanity, translated by Stuart Woolf 
(New York: The Orion Press, 1959), 135-136. 
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Levi published his memoir in his native tongue, Italian, in 1947, but the memoir failed to 
gain much interest beyond his hometown until a reprint was made 10 years later; it took 
time for the book to become widely read, but by 1963 it has been translated into English, 
French, German, Finnish, and Dutch.15 
 Vera Schwarz, a descendent of Holocaust survivors and a historian, wrote a 
fantastic analysis of the role shame plays in trauma-inflicted memory. In her article, “The 
‘Black Milk’ of Historical Consciousness,” Schwarz uses survivor Paul Celan’s Poem, 
“Deathsfugue,” to reveal the “limitations [that] historical consciousness” has in dealing 
with the ugly truth, which he poetically refers to as the “black milk” of history.16 Schwarz 
paints a clear picture of the Jewish resistance to Holocaust memory in the early years 
after the war. She explains that by the time the war was coming to an end, Jews in 
another part of the world – the Middle East – were fighting hard to establish their own 
homeland. With the creation of the State of Israel came a new beginning, the next 
chapter, in Jewish history. These Zionists saw themselves as a different breed of Jew, 
they were heroic fighters unlike the “unheroic ‘wretches” of European Jews who “begged 
for mercy to no avail.”17 This led to many survivors changing their names in an effort to 
bury the past.18 They felt that the world did not care about their suffering.19 
 Holocaust scholar Tim Cole also explains this period of neglect eloquently in his 
book, Selling the Holocaust. Cole introduces his own ideas while incorporating the work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Primo Levi and Marco Belpoliti, The Black Hole of Auschwitz (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 
25.  
16 Vera Schwarcz, “The ‘Black Milk’ of Historical Consciousness: Thinking About the Nanking 
Massacre in Light of Jewish Memory,” in Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing, ed. by Fei Fei Li, 
Robert Sabella, and David Liu (M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 183-184. 
17 Schawrz, “The ‘Black Milk,’ of Historical Consciousness,” 187-188. 
18 Schawrz, “The ‘Black Milk,’ of Historical Consciousness,” 188. 
19 Saul Friedlander, Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), 46.  
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of several previous historians such as Saul Friedlander, Lawrence Langer, and James 
Young – to name a few.20 He coins the term “the myth of the Holocaust,” to describe the 
process of applying meaning and understanding to the murder of the 6 million Jews.21 
Cole describes the period between the end of the war and leading up to the Eichmann 
Trial in 1961 as a “veil of silence” in Israel, and tells the story of survivor Dorothy 
Rabinowitz in America who was questioned about the numbers on her arm in the 50’s.22 
The obvious Holocaust symbolisms of today, like the tattooed numbers on the forearm, 
were mysteries to most people in the 40s and 50s. Cole also points out the word 
“Holocaust” was not used in the New York Times as the term to describe the murder of 6 
million Jewish until May 30, 1959.23 
 What scholars like LaCapra, Schwarz, and Cole overlooked is that while the 
Holocaust may not have grabbed the public spotlight until the end of the 50’s, this does 
not mean that no one was remembering or dealing with what had happened. What they 
perceive as neglect may in fact be a necessary, and perhaps even a healthy, silence. 
People do not talk with their mouths full, and people are taught to think before speaking. 
In the same manner, it should come with no surprise that open discussion and 
memorialization should be preceded by quiet reflection – people need time to chew and 
digest. While the world looked past the death of 6 million Jews, survivors were deep in 
the throes of a more private memorialization, which took the form of a genre of memoirs 
called Yizkor Bikor. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Tim Cole, Selling the Holocaust: from Auschwitz to Schindler how history is bought packaged, 
and sold (New York: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1999), vii-viii. 
21 Cole, Selling the Holocaust, 3-4. 
22 Cole, Selling the Holocaust, 3, 8. 
23 Cole, Selling the Holocaust, 7. 
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 Yizkor Bikor, Yiddish for “books of remembrance,” is a genre comprised of tens 
of thousands of memoirs that document the destruction of thousands of individual towns 
caused by the Holocaust. Their main purpose was for the author(s) to be able to record 
what had been lost: the culture, the religion, the architecture, the history, and most 
importantly the individuals who were killed. In order to do this justice, most of the books 
include lists of names, maps, and a variety of folk legends, but they also include the 
experiences and stories of lives during the Holocaust. These books were almost always 
published in limited print, usually fewer than 1,000 copies, because their audience was 
limited to “the community of survivors and émigrés from the town.”24 In a larger sense, 
these books were a burial of sorts for all of the victims who never received a proper 
burial – the most sincere and honest way of commemorating and remembering what had 
happened under the Third Reich. These memoirs provided closure and reveal to the 
historian a period of inner reflection. 
It is perhaps ironic that one of the most important forms of Jewish 
memorialization has been widely ignored in recent Holocaust literature.25 This is most 
likely the case because these memoirs were not written for the world, but for the smaller, 
more specific audiences – the respective communities of the authors. Thus, Holocaust 
literature ignored them because they were not designed for public consumption. 
Furthermore, they were not available in other languages until recently and many have still 
not been translated to date. In 1983, Jack Kugelmass and Jonathan Boyarin, editors and 
translators of From A Ruined Garden, point out that these books had been widely 
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overlooked.26 More work and attention has been put towards the genre, yet they still 
remain largely unincorporated with wider literature on the Holocaust. 
For the study of Holocaust remembrance and commemoration, the Yizkor books 
reveals activity that contradicts the widely accepted narrative that survivors neglected 
their past before 1961. The New York Public Library has one of the largest Yizkor book 
collections in their online database with almost 700 available records. Looking at their 
collection of books that were published before 1961 shows 157 results, almost a quarter 
of their entire collection. This is evidence that the Holocaust was not an entirely 
neglected subject before the Eichmann trial. Rather, victims were hard at work to make 
sure that their experiences were recorded and not forgotten. This does not mean that the 
Holocaust was widely studied at this time; people other than the victims were not 
interested or ready to confront the topic. LaCapra, Schwarz, Cole, and others were right 
in arguing that there was a period of global neglect. Primo Levi’s memoir, Survival in 
Auschwitz, did not succeed until it was reprinted in the late 50’s and early 60’s. Raul 
Hilberg’s monumental contribution to Holocaust literature, The Destruction of the 
European Jews, which he started writing in 1948, could not get a publisher until 1961.27 
However, this silence does not mean that everyone neglected the topic; Levi, Hilberg, and 
hundreds of others were quietly writing away. Instead, the silence is evidence that the 
Holocaust needed time to be digested before it could become a mainstream topic. 
World powers like America, Britain, the Soviet Union, and Israel had their own 
interests in mind that led to a general avoidance of Holocaust commemoration. On the 
other hand, Germany was dealing with an internal struggle on how to confront the 	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destruction that its previous government was responsible for. Saul Friedlander paints a 
bleak picture of this struggle in his book, Memory, History, and the Extermination of the 
Jews of Europe, where he describes a nation “unable to explore Nazi past in any 
significant way.”28 Friedlander argues that the Holocaust remained an elephant in the 
room for the German public until the 60’s, when the second generation responded to the 
Eichmann trial by pressuring their parents into openly confronting the past.  
Germany’s inability in the 40’s and 50’s to confront its past can be paralleled with 
the difficulty Israelis had facing the Holocaust in the early days of the State. Israelis 
disassociated themselves with survivors because they were perceived as “weak,” which 
contradicted the image of the strong, independent Zionist who built the new State from 
the ground up. Germans, too, were trying to build up a new state with a new government. 
They wanted to be motivated by the idea of starting anew with a clean slate, but 
memorializing the past seemed to tarnish that image. Germans wanted to look forward, 
not harp on topics that risked rocking an already unstable nation. James Young reveals 
this struggle in his book, The Texture of Memory:  
…the ambiguity of German memory comes as no surprise. After all, while 
the victors of history have long erected monuments to their triumphs and 
victims have built memorials to their martyrdom, only rarely does a nation 
call upon itself to remember the victims of crimes it has perpetrated. 
Where are the national monuments to the genocide of American Indians, 
to the millions of Africans enslaved and murdered, to the Russian kulaks 
and peasants starved to death by the millions? They barely exist.29 
 
Young’s rhetorical question forces the outsider to see this from the German perspective. 
This deeper layer, the self-guilt of the perpetrator, distinguishes Germany’s struggle from 
Israel’s. It is hard for a nation to confront a dark past when it is trying to rebuild and look 	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to the future, but it is all the more difficult when that nation is perceived to be guilty of 
the worst crime in history. 
 By the time the Eichmann trial began on April 11, 1961, Holocaust remembrance 
was entering a new phase, which would last for Germany until 1985. In this span of two 
and a half decades Israel, America, and Germany took on the challenge of confronting the 
Holocaust. However, each country had to develop a narrative that it found comfortable: 
Israel put disproportionate emphasis on heroism and martyrdom, America put special 
attention on its role in liberating the camps and defeating the Germans, and Germany 
engaged in a serious national dialogue over its past and what that meant for its present. 
 The Israeli government had made rudimentary attempts at adopting the Shoah, the 
Hebrew name for the Holocaust, in the early 50’s. Most notable was the installment in 
1951 of Yom Hashoah, a day dedicated to remembering what had happened, and the 
establishment of the Yad Vashem organization two years after. However, both the 
national holiday and the new organization received scant attention from the public until 
after the Eichmann trial.30 In the 50s, while the Israeli masses remained mostly 
unaffected by these new developments, the Knesset was involved in a secret project; the 
Israeli Secret Service installed a department in 1951 tasked with capturing prominent 
Nazi war criminals that had never been captured and brought to justice.31 It was this 
development that led to the capture, trial, and indictment of Adolf Eichmann nearly a 
decade later. 
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 The Eichmann trial was monumental in bringing the Shoah out of the shadows 
and into mainstream public discourse. The key reason for this was that the trial signaled 
to the world that the Jewish people, under the Jewish state, were ready to adopt the 
catastrophe as part of their identity. However, this was only possible due to the media 
attention that the trial received. This was the first trial where selections of the 
proceedings were internationally broadcasted live by television. Furthermore, the 
courtroom itself had a larger international audience than domestic. 50 countries had 
representation comprising of journalists, diplomats, legal observers, and prominent 
leaders of anti-Nazi organizations.32 Since the trial reached a global audience, it was able 
to initiate a global dialogue over the fate of European Jews during the Second World 
War. The Jerusalem Post recognized this international attention in October of 1961, 
foreshadowing the lasting impact that the trial would have. The article, written by 
Geoffrey Wigoder and titled “Eichmann Trial Made Its Impact,” examined popular 
opinion in America, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, the Soviet Union, 
and even the Arab populations before and after the trial.33 Wigoder noted that before the 
trial there was significantly more opposition to it, but as the proceedings developed 
criticism trailed off with few exceptions. This initial contestation arguably helped bolster 
the trial’s publicity and global interest. However, the world was able to take up such 
interest because of the technological advances since the Nuremberg War Crimes trials. 
Television and travel were much more widely accessible to the public by the early 60’s. 
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 Another significant difference between the Eichmann and Nuremberg Trials was 
the focus. As discussed above, the Allies sought justice to satisfy their own agendas 
overshadowing the distinct crimes against Jews. With Adolf Eichmann being captured by 
Israeli secret agents and being tried in an Israeli court this trial was to fulfill an Israeli 
agenda, one that entirely focused on the fate of European Jews. In fact, Cole explains the 
trial’s wider purpose as being “about anti-Semitism in general, the ‘Holocaust’ in 
particular, and Eichmann himself only rather peripherally.”34 The Nuremberg Trials 
consisted of four counts, none of which focused explicitly on the Nazi crimes against the 
Jews. On the other hand, Eichmann was charged on fifteen counts, the first eight of which 
were solely concerned with his crimes against Jews.35 Evidence for the trial was 
comprised of 1,600 documents, 108 survivor witnesses, and a selection of scholarly 
experts.36 It was in this special circumstance, with complete Israeli control over the 
situation, that the young nation was able to talk openly about the Holocaust.   
 The Eichmann trial also stirred the German people, particularly in West Germany, 
to begin to confront past crimes. German youth in their late teens had grown up in an 
environment completely silent about what their parents had been part of. This new 
generation was either born after WWII or too young to remember it, and they were taught 
nothing about it in school. With the trial being globally broadcasted the grotesque facts of 
Germany’s guilt prompted German youth to question their parents and that entire 
generation with “the questions asked of Eichmann in Jerusalem.”37 The outcome was a 
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national conversation over past guilt while the trial in Jerusalem was in full motion. The 
Jerusalem Post reported in July of 1961 nation-wide “horror and sorrow” in West 
Germany from “recitals at the trial of train rides to death camps and what happened in 
those camps.”38 
Tim Cole argued that the trial was the event that opened up the door for the public 
to confront the Holocaust. Cole particularly focuses on how the trial enabled public 
discussions on the Holocaust in Israel and West Germany.39 While Cole wrote a good 
analysis on the role that the trial played on prompting historical revisionism across the 
globe, he did not mention the importance that the timing for the trial had on its global 
impact. The timing of the trial was just as important for its success as the trial’s content 
was. If the same trial had taken place 10 years earlier, it would not have had the same 
impact because it would not have had such a global audience. Additionally, there would 
not have been enough time for the past to be digested by survivor, perpetrator, bystander, 
or Zionist.   
In the aftermath of the Eichmann trial Israel was able to adapt the Holocaust into 
a suitable narrative. However, this narrative was not exactly representative of what had 
happened. Yes, Israel tried Adolf Eichmann and Israelis listened to hundreds of 
testimonies from survivors, but Israel’s narrative put a much larger emphasis on praising 
Jewish heroism and martyrdom than on mourning the dead and focusing on the actual 
atrocity, pain, and sorrow that Germany had caused. This disproportionate emphasis on 
heroism reveals itself when looking at Israel’s two biggest modes of Holocaust 
commemoration: Yom Hashoah and Yad Vashem. 	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 The Israeli parliament designated the 27th of the Hebrew month of Nissan as the 
day for Yom Hashoah in 1951, but the holiday was not widely celebrated until around the 
time Eichmann was put to trial. The holiday was originally implemented as a day for 
Jews to mourn those who were killed on an unknown date. This was inspired from a 
Jewish religious custom in which immediate family members of the deceased practice an 
extra level of mourning on the Yarziet, or anniversary, of when that person passed away. 
The holiday enters its critical moment with a two-minute, nation-wide siren. For these 
two minutes time in Israel stops, cars come to a halt on the highway, radio stations pause 
their broadcasts, and the whole state mourns together. For Jews, this is an event that is 
unequaled in its impact to create a deep sense of unity, regardless – or even in spite of – 
their differences.  
However, the date that the government picked for this “day of mourning” was 
also the Jewish date of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising – the paramount example of Jewish 
heroism during the war. This overlap was no coincidence – it was designed with acute 
purpose. Israelis had to remember the Holocaust in a vein that matched the young 
nation’s image of Jewish strength and bravery. In order to do this, Israel had to create a 
way that commemorated the Holocaust without focusing too heavily on the slaughter of 
so many Jews. Israel accomplished this by making the official name for the holiday, as 
referred to on the Yad Vashem website, “Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance 
Day.” Furthermore, the holiday itself is followed by a day to remember those who had 
died fighting in Israeli wars, which is then followed by Israeli Independence Day – the 
happiest most celebratory day in the Israeli calendar.40 Adding all of this to the picture 
exposes the nation’s difficulty to really commemorate the Holocaust. If anything, the 	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Holocaust is more celebrated by Israelis than it is mourned. Is a two-minute silence 
enough to really mourn the death of six million Jews? Do not the holiday’s name, date, 
and association to other holidays through proximity overshadow any sincere attempt to 
remember the dead? What it does do is convey an Israeli message: the Holocaust was 
able to happen because there was no Jewish state to prevent it and no Jewish army to 
fight for and defend European Jewry.   
Tim Cole describes Yad Vashem’s development over the years as one that has 
struggled to acknowledge the Holocaust without putting too much emphasis on heroism 
and bravery.  Out of the nine original memorial objectives for the museum, 6 were 
dedicated to heroism and only 3 to destruction.41 The first two exhibits that Yad Vashem 
dedicated, Memorial Hill and the Hall of Remembrance, were focused on destruction.42 
However, Memorial Hill was just a spot to privately remember the dead while 
overlooking the surrounding hills. The underlying message was clear: look at the 
beautiful Jewish homeland that did not exist when those who perished needed it. Other 
memorials dedicated to loss and death are the privately funded Children’s Memorial in 
1987, The Valley of the Destroyed Communities in 1992, and the Hall of Names in 2005. 
The Children’s Memorial was actually designed by Moshe Safdie, a famous architect, 
under the request of Yad Vashem in 1976, but it took 11 years before anyone wanted to 
fund the project.43 With the exception of Memorial Hill, these spaces are either enclosed 
indoors or are off to the side from the main complex. 
While the few memorials commemorating death were built over a long period of 
time, memorials and monuments dedicated to heroism were erected consistently over the 	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lifespan of the museum. This began with the Avenue of the Righteous Gentiles, a line of 
trees planted in 1962 to pay tribute to all of the non-Jews who risked their lives and the 
lives of their families to save Jews. It would become the entrance to the entire museum 
complex.44 After visitors walk through the grove of gentile righteousness they enter the 
Warsaw Ghetto Square. Built in 1973, this space showcases Jewish heroism and bravery 
during WWII through the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and it continues to be the space used 
to commence Yom Hashoah.45 Other notable dedications that highlight bravery are the 
Pillar of Heroism, which was erected in 1974 and remains the tallest object in the entire 
complex, the Soldiers, Ghetto Fighters, and Partisans monument (1985), the Nieuwlande 
Monument (1988), the Garden of the Righteous Among the Nations beginning in 1996 
(and not the be confused with the Avenue established 34 years earlier), and the Partisan’s 
Panorama (2003). Smaller monuments have also been added over time, but these remain 
the most significant. They stand proudly erect out in the open and counteract the sites of 
mourning. They are also spread out throughout the complex. Visitors cannot reach any 
sites of mourning without encountering a space dedicated to heroism and bravery. 
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Map of Yad Vashem with Memorials Marked46 
 
 
While Israel was developing its own way to remember and commemorate the 
Holocaust that was not too sensitive, Germany was undergoing its own awakening to its 
crimes against the Jewish people. The Eichmann trial made a splash so big that it changed 
the current in German discourse. Before the trial took place, Germany was doing its best 
to avoid the subject of Jewish extermination, but after 1961 national dialogue and 
government action erupted. This new openness – almost eagerness – to remember the 
past can be seen by examining two types of action – one subtle and the other very public. 
The 60’s brought a willingness to educate youth and a determination to hold ex-Nazis 
accountable for past crimes on German soil. Germany was able to separate the new from 
the old, the future from the past, by creating a curriculum on the Holocaust.  
Education was perhaps the change that had the biggest impact in German society, 
but was also the least noticeable development because it was completely internal. Before 	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the 1960’s schools did not deal with history past the 19th century.47 This changed after the 
Eichmann trial when German schools began to confront the Holocaust. A prominent 
German historian named Hannah Vogt published “one of the most widely circulated 
histories of modern Germany” in 1961, a secondary school textbook called The Burden of 
Guilt.48 In the 12-chapter book, Vogt goes to great lengths separating Germany from 
Hitler. She describes Germany as a united nation and Hitler as the antithesis and 
destroyer of that united German national pride.49 No subject is left out and the 
longstanding presence of German anti-Semitism is acknowledged; the book covers 
everything from the 1096 pogrom in Worms leading up to the exterminations in 
Auschwitz.50  
The textbook goes beyond teaching facts and developing an appropriate German 
narrative. Vogt actually addresses the present day 1960’s by connecting the past crimes to 
the ongoing anti-Semitism in Germany. In the conclusion, she rhetorically asks:  
Should we listen to insinuations that the time has come to forget crimes 
and victims because nobody must incriminate himself? Is it not, rather, 
cowardly, mean, and miserable to deny even now the dead the honor they 
deserve, and forget them as quickly as possible?51 
 
Vogt went on to argue that Germans had a choice. They could either regress by not 
confronting their nation’s past, or they could learn from the past and work towards 
reunifying Germany once more. She puts it in clear terms: “The past cannot be erased, 
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but the future is free.”52 By teaching the subject in secondary schools, the Holocaust was 
saved from being forgotten by an entire generation of Germans. 
 The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials from 1963-1965 marked the first public action by 
German officials to not only confront the Holocaust, but also hold ex-Nazis accountable 
for past crimes. The trial, which was expected to culminate within the year, convicted 22 
former Nazis, consisted of more than 60,000 pages of material, and included the 
testimonies of 254 witnesses from across the globe.53 The purpose of the trial was “to 
determine the guilt of each defendant as specifically as possible,” but it also brought the 
Holocaust into the German spotlight.54  
 It was in this spotlight that the witnesses went into grotesque details of their 
persecution, touching on subjects that were previously too sensitive to discuss. For 
example one testimony accused defendant Stefan Baretzki of using prisoners to practice 
killing with “a blow from the side of his hand,” and one witness explained that conditions 
in his camp got so bad that rats began eating sick patients.55 At some points the topic was 
too much for the spectators to handle. The New York Times reported an instance when a 
witness was describing how defendant Oswald Kaduk had chased a group of children into 
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the gas chambers with his pistol when someone from the audience screamed, “Why don’t 
you beat the pig to death?”56  
 The trial was not spared from criticism. The Jerusalem Post published a critical 
article on the trial in December of 1964 entitled, “Auschwitz Trial Bored Germans.”57 
The article stated, “the public in Germany and abroad has apparently become bored by its 
catalogue of suffering.”58 This could have been true for a combination of reasons. For 
one, the trial was at first expected to last a year at most. With no end in sight at the close 
of 1964, the public could have been overwhelmed with the whole ordeal. The trial also 
focused much more on the individual crimes of the defendants instead of dealing with 
larger topics, like discussing what led men to commit such crimes and the “deeper 
implications of the murders.”59 However, the criticism could also be seen as unfair and a 
little unfounded. Media and news run at a fast pace. As new events take place the 
spotlight shifts. The trial being less reported on as time passed should not counteract the 
impact that the trial itself had, nor should it diminish from the fact that Germany put on 
such a trial with the support of its people. This event was a sign that Germany was trying 
to face its past and do exactly what Hannah Vogt challenged of her nation – to remember 
the past while looking to the future. 
 The eruption in Germany to incorporate the Holocaust eventually boiled over in 
1985. To a certain degree Hannah Vogt’s message was too difficult to achieve. For some 
Germans, separating themselves from the Third Reich while accepting responsibility for 
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its crimes was too contradictory. This conflict did not appear out of nowhere in 1985; it 
had built up over time. A telling example of this was the German public’s split reaction in 
1970 when their Chancellor Willy Brandt famously kneeled and wept at a wreath laying 
ceremony that he was attending in the old Warsaw Ghetto.60 The Chancellor’s memoir 
revealed the polarization of the nation. He wrote, recalling for some “there was no lack of 
questions, either malicious or foolish,” while at the same time he was told by others, “that 
the gesture had in fact touched many people.”61 Brandt quoted one reporter whom he felt 
identified the source of discomfort: “He who does not need to kneel knelt, on behalf of all 
who do need to kneel but do not – because they dare not, or cannot, or cannot dare to 
kneel.”62 As time passed and the younger generation who were born after WWII grew 
older, some Germans became irritated with their responsibility for crimes they never 
committed.  
 May 8th, 1985 marked the 40th anniversary of Germany’s defeat, an anniversary 
that was observed by Germany. This event sparked a national debate over whether or not 
Germany should observe this holiday, which led to larger questions over German guilt for 
what happened over 40 years ago. It started with President Richard von Weizsäcker’s 
commemorative speech, which led to the famous historians’ debate. These politicians and 
scholars reflected the national mood, which can be examined through Germany’s 
monuments and memorials. The battle was taking placing on all levels, top to bottom. It 
is important to note the context surrounding this German reaction in the late 80’s. At the 
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time of these debates, nobody knew that the Berlin Wall would soon fall and nobody 
knew that the Soviet Union was going to collapse. The wall and Soviets greatly affected 
the way Germans perceived their situation after WWII, shaping the way many people 
thought. 
 When President Weizsäcker addressed his nation he spoke aggressively about 
German responsibility. He dispelled the older Germans’ rhetoric, which claimed that they 
had been unaware of what was happening, and he scolded the youth for resisting their 
duty to remember.63 Weizsäcker put it bluntly to the older generation:  
Who could remain unsuspecting after the burning of the synagogues, the 
plundering, the stigmatization with the Star of David, the deprivation of 
rights, the ceaseless violation of human dignity? ...Whoever opened his 
eyes and ears and sought information could not fail to notice that Jews 
were being deported.64 
 
He made it painfully clear that ignorance was not only a lie, but it was a cover for guilt. 
The president concluded his remarks with a plea for the younger generation to embrace 
reconciliation, and he argued that this could only be done if Germany continued to 
remember: “The Jewish nation remembers and will always remember. We seek 
reconciliation. Precisely for this reason we must understand that there can be no 
reconciliation without remembrance.”65 Germany’s president was admitting full 
responsibility on behalf of his people and proclaiming that the only path forward was by 
carrying the burden of the past into the future.  
 In response to the President’s charged remarks, historian Golo Mann and editor-
in-chief of the Der Spiegel, Rudolph Augstein, questioned the whole notion of the Nazi 	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era’s unique status as having been an unprecedented time. By dismissing German 
singularity, they dismissed the notion that it was necessary to remember the past with 
such austerity. Mann brings up Napoléon’s massacre at Waterloo, pointing out that 
nobody was paying close attention to it four decades later.66 If the horrendous actions of 
the Nazis could be brought down to the level of other crimes in history, then surely the 
world can get past the Holocaust just as it had done with previous atrocities. Augstein 
goes further by bringing examples from the more recent past. He points out Stalin’s terror 
in Russia and the extreme suggestions made by some American officials during the war 
that advocated for the “general sterilization of the German population.”67 Neither Mann 
nor Augstein were denying the mass murder committed by the Nazi regime, but they both 
saw a problem with putting Hitler and the Third Reich on an untouchable pedestal 
beyond all other crimes. 
 The historians’ debate continued the struggle over questions of German 
responsibility and the uniqueness of the Nazi crimes at a more ideological level. The two 
key players in the dispute were historians Ernest Nolte and Jürgen Habermas. Despite its 
name, Saul Friedlander points out that the debate was much more about shaping the past 
“in terms of public memory and national identity” than it was an intellectual argument 
confined to the realm of academia.68 Nolte called the German obsession to remember, 
“the past that will not pass,” an unnecessary exception in world history; he argued that 
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almost everything the Nazis did was adopted from the Bolsheviks’ “White terror” of the 
previous century.69 In compelling language, Nolte connects these two atrocities:  
But just as a murder, especially a mass murder, cannot be ‘justified’ by 
another murder, so, too, we will be led thoroughly astray by an attitude 
that only takes note of one murder and of one mass murder, and that does 
not want to take note of the other one, even though there is probably a 
causal connection between them.70 
 
On the other side, Habermas went on the offense by accusing Nolte of nitpicking 
examples to support his own political agenda. He rebutted Nolte’s oversimplification of 
Nazi crimes, writing: “Anyone who wants to drive away our shame about this fact 
through a slogan like ‘obsession with guilt’… is destroying the only reliable foundation 
for our ties to the West.”71 Nolte and Habermas were key players who represent each side 
of the larger debate.  
 The national mood reflected the dispute at the political and scholarly levels. This 
struggle over guilt persisted at the ground level too. The public had mixed reactions to 
monuments and memorials that were being built to commemorate the Holocaust. There 
are five examples of this that James Young details in his book, The Texture of Memory: 
the first of Hrdlicka’s four part Countermonument revealed in 1985, Gerzes’ 
Countermonument revealed in 1986, “Skulptur Projekte 87” revealed in 1987, Hoheisel’s 
“Negative-Form” Monument revealed in 1987, and Radermacher’s Disruption of Public 
Space revealed in 1992.72 Young pays particular attention to the reactions that some of 
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these monuments received upon being dedicated. Hrdlicka’s four-part countermonument, 
which was commissioned by the city of Hamburg to counter a fascist memorial dedicated 
to the fallen soldiers of Germany in wartime, was only half completed because the initial 
interest for it waned.73 Gerzes’ Countermonument in Harburg was a self-destructive 
monument that people could graffiti their thoughts onto as it sank into the ground over 
time. It was compared to “a great black knife in the back of Germany.”74 “Skulptur 
Projekte 87,” was designed to be a big black brick of an eyesore and placed smack in the 
middle of Munster’s palace square. It was met with such hysteria from locals that it was 
demolished within the year of its dedication and eventually rebuilt in Hamburg in 1989.75 
All of these monuments were placed in public spaces. The reactions reveal a stark 
contrast of interests. On one hand, these monuments were being commissioned, money 
was being put toward them, and in some cases the public even demanded that they be 
built. However, at the same time they were met with severe criticism. Some of the 
monuments were even vandalized with Nazi symbolisms.76  
 From President Weizsäcker to Ernest Nolte to the people of Hamburg, there was a 
severe reaction to the period of openness that the Eichmann trial had stirred in Germany. 
In many respects, Hannah Vogt accomplished her mission. Germans were certainly 
thinking of the future by confronting the conflicted past. Regardless whether people were 
for or against looking back on the Nazi era, everyone had an opinion and all sides were 
voiced. Young describes this division of opinions as the “texture” of memory – the idea 
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that one nation shares multiple opinions.77 Even Ernest Nolte’s argument against German 
responsibility and originality, as extreme as it is, fulfills the demand to remember in some 
respect.   
 Today, Holocaust remembrance has been stuck in a transitional phase for the last 
few decades. The Holocaust is gradually becoming historicized as the remaining first 
generation of survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders pass away. How it will be 
historicized will largely depend on how it has been remembered over time. The 
Holocaust has been confronted and memorialized by nations differently, but all treat it 
with paramount importance. In a sense, it is because it is so important that Israel and 
Germany have struggled to incorporate it into their national identities. This struggle has 
caused the subject to be construed by all that confront it. Immediately after Germany’s 
unconditional surrender the victorious Allies conducted the Nuremberg Trials, thus 
dominating the subject. In doing so, the Allies downplayed the death of six million Jews 
by focusing more generally on the Second World War. This is one reason why 
remembering the six million murdered Jews was difficult, but shame and discomfort 
hushed public commemoration in Israel and Germany. However, contrary to mainstream 
scholarly opinion, survivors did internally memorialize and remember through modes 
such as writing Yizkor Bikor memoirs. It was not until Jews came together by collectively 
adopting the catastrophe that Holocaust remembrance experienced a 180-degree flip, 
dominating public discourse. The Eichmann trial was instrumental in this, influencing 
Germany to revisit its past. However, the “texture” of memory that James Young 
cautions not to ignore was particularly prevalent in Germany. While Germany fully 
accepted its status as the perpetrator of the Holocaust, the struggle to become a nation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Young, The Texture of Memory, x. 
	   33	  
reborn caused many Germans to question their level of guilt. Whether the Holocaust has 
been overshadowed by outsiders, been focused too much on heroism, or has inflicted 
guilt on an entire nation, one common denominator stands out. The Holocaust has 
become the icon of mass murder. In fact, out of it the world coined a new term – 
genocide. How this term, this word to describe the worst of crimes, is interpreted and 
applied will determine what lesson has been learned from the Holocaust.	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Genocide	  Again:	  Cambodia’s	  Struggle	  to	  Remember	  
	  
There is very little research and scholarly work that deals with how the 
Cambodian Genocide has been memorialized. Plenty of books address the history, the 
politics, or the country’s current situation. A plethora of research focuses on the Khmer 
Rouge period and the effects it has had on the nation today. However, few sources deal 
specifically with how the genocide has been remembered over time. When analyzing how 
an event is memorialized, it is important to note that a country’s narrative and how the 
people of that country remember an event are not one and the same. A country’s narrative 
is often heavily politicized. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between how the 
Cambodian people and the government have remembered and commemorated it. With 
this distinction in mind, the author examines how Cambodians and the government have 
dealt with their dark past.78 The genocide has been largely neglected until recently. Three 
significant reasons have caused this neglect: they have been primed to forget, they 
struggle to understand, and they have been caught between desiring peace and justice. 
The Vietnamese and the subsequent Cambodian PRK regime started genocide 
memorialization, but public commemoration has been an area of debate amongst 
Cambodians to this day. In order to show how these struggles persist, one must examine 
the history leading up to, during, and after the Khmer Rouge regime while taking time to 
analyze how the genocide has been remembered in specific circumstances.  
Before examining how Cambodians have been primed to forget, it is important to 
acknowledge that the crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge are not universally 
accepted as “genocide.” Manus I. Midlarsky breaks the catastrophe down into numbers 	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and facts by examining who was slaughtered, who did the killing, and what were the 
motives behind it in his book, The Killing Trap. He concludes that the term “genocide” 
could only be used to describe the fate of ethnic minorities in Cambodia, notably those 
who were ethnically Vietnamese, Chinese, Laotian, Thai, or Cham.79 The percentage of 
those either killed or deported in each of those groups varies from 36% of the Cham to 
100% of the Vietnamese.80 These groups experienced higher levels of discrimination than 
the 25% of ethnic Khmer who died for non-racial reasons. Thus, Midlarsky defines the 
killings of ethnic Khmer as “politicide” rather than genocide; he borrows Kenneth 
Quinn’s description comparing Pol Pot’s actions to having “Mao’s plan with Stalin’s 
methods.”81 The intentions and results of the Khmer Rouge, according to some scholars 
like Midlarsky, was not strictly genocide. If the killing fields are not considered genocide, 
then what happened in Cambodia could be seen as a lesser evil to the Holocaust because 
of what the word “genocide” connotes. 
On the opposite side, anthropologist and author of the book Beyond the Killing 
Fields, Usha Welaratna, refers to the Khmer Rouge period as “the holocaust.”82 She does 
not even entertain the argument that it was not genocide. Although Welaratna does not 
explain why she used “holocaust” to describe the period, it can be easily extrapolated. 
She does not focus on formal definitions, percentages, and numbers; instead, she studies 
Cambodians and examines how their lives were completely destroyed by the Khmer 
Rouge. For Welaratna, calling what happened anything less than a “holocaust” would be 
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offensive to those who lived through it and those who died. Scholars like Manus I. 
Midlarsky and Usha Welaratna represent extremes from either side. Most sources refer to 
the period as genocide, or attempted genocide. Although these scholars represent both 
extremes, it is important to recognize the big gap of what is acceptable when referring to 
this period. The fact that the years between 1975 and 1979 can be referred to as anything 
from a mass killing to a holocaust adds an element to the discussion of how it is 
remembered. 
Cambodians have been primed to forget, or rather not to think or question things. 
This has made genocide remembrance especially difficult. Cambodian culture historically 
has had a big socio-economic gap between the corrupt elites and ordinary people, with 
the former running the nation. When the Khmer Rouge took control they distorted this 
culture to extreme proportions by making it their own.  Dating back to Angkor times, 
kings treated their people as “pawns in service of their own agendas.”83 Elites could take 
anything they wanted from ordinary people, even their lives. This culture survived long 
after the demise of the great Angkor period, and was only reinforced by the heavy taxes 
imposed on the Cambodian masses during and after the French Colonial period.84 
Additionally, only children of the elites benefited from the westernized education that the 
French brought.85 This culture, which fostered a massive class gap between ordinary 
people and the more removed elite, primed the masses to put up with what was demanded 
of them. This has made the idea of remembrance especially foreign to most.  
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Cambodians were actually overjoyed initially when the Khmer Rouge claimed 
victory, overtaking Phnom Penh on April 17, 1979. These communists were nationalist 
fighters and ethnic Khmer, “brothers of the same race” who stood for “a less corrupt 
social order.”86 Cambodians welcomed the new regime; they believed it meant an end to 
the longtime social structures imposed on them by the ruling powers, and they hoped it 
also meant peace. The idea that each person should be equal to his/her neighbor was 
appealing.  
The Central Party of the Khmer Rouge was highly insecure. They executed a 
radical plan to transform everyone into rural peasants, which forcefully and brutally 
flipped society upside down. This enforced an environment where thinking could get one, 
and one’s entire family, killed. The Khmer Rouge leadership was so secretive that they 
ended up only enhancing the old power system, making society even more radical and 
dangerous. On the same day that the Khmer Rouge took control of Phnom Penh they 
immediately evacuated everyone into the countryside.87 Chum Mey, one of the few 
survivors of the Tuol Sleng interrogation camp, recalled the rushed evacuation of the city 
in his autobiography, Survivor: “They said if we stayed, we would die because the 
Americans were planning to bomb the city. There was no need to take any belongings 
because it would only be three days.”88 Another survivor nicknamed Mum, who was only 
eight when the Khmer Rouge took power, recalled clearly how the soldiers threatened to 
shoot them when her family did not immediately leave.89 This rushed evacuation was 
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caused by Pol Pot’s insecurity. He believed that any delay could allow the educated elite 
enough time to form an opposition against his revolution.90 
Anyone that could possibly be perceived as anti-revolutionary could disappear. 
Even those who were associated with anti-revolutionary people were not safe. The people 
who were deemed anti-revolutionary were the educated. The Khmer Rouge soldiers made 
it brutally clear that education was useless under their superimposed society – survival 
depended on listening and not questioning. One soldier put it this way: “If Angka says to 
break rocks, break rocks. If Angka says to dig canals, you must dig canals… our school is 
the farm. The land is our paper, the plow is our pen.”91 A survivor named Heng Chi, who 
was a judge by profession, narrowly avoided his own execution by hiding his identity 
after he saw that “judges, teachers, bankers, soldiers, and politicians were subject to 
execution.”92 Mum’s father was asked to answer some questions and then never returned 
home. They never found out what happened to him or why because the whole family was 
at risk of being abducted if they asked too many questions.93 Disappearing relatives was a 
common theme during this period. 
Nobody was safe, not even the Khmer Rouge soldiers themselves. One soldier 
was demoted when his superiors discovered that his father had driven an orange truck in 
Phnom Penh before the war.94 Thousands of Khmer Rouge cadres whose ideology was 
put to question ended up imprisoned and interrogated in Tuol Sleng and then summarily 
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executed.95 As time went on, Pol Pot and the Party Central became so obsessively 
paranoid that there would have been little difference between his role and that of kings of 
ancient Angkor if there had not been such an emphasis put on secrecy.96  Thus, the 
Khmer Rouge reinforced the belief in Cambodians that it was wrong to act or think 
independently. By not having the ability to digest what was happening to them under the 
Khmer Rouge, it has become very difficult for them to remember or commemorate it.  
In addition to the cultural hindrances to remembering, Cambodians have struggled 
to comprehend the genocide. One of the most difficult aspects to date for Cambodians in 
understanding the catastrophe is: why did Khmer kill Khmer?97 For any mass killing and 
attempted genocide, victims struggle with comprehending why so many were killed. 
However, Alexander Hinton explains that for Cambodians, this question is “particularly 
vexing” because majority of the perpetrators and victims were of the same ethnicity.98 
Furthermore, since the fall of the regime ex-Khmer Rouge and victims have been living 
side by side. Many Cambodians cannot distinguish who in their village was Khmer 
Rouge and who was a victim because when the regime collapsed, many fled to new 
villages – “their fellow villagers, and sometimes even their wives and children did not 
know about their background.”99 This causes even more embarrassment and adds to the 
reason why many Cambodians prefer to bury their traumas deep within themselves 
instead of coming together as a nation to commemorate the past.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 David Chandler, Voices from S-21: terror and history in Pol Pot’s secret prison (Berkeley: 
University California Press, 1999), 36-37, 43-45. 
96 Chandler, Voices from S-21, 16. And Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, 133. 
97 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, 15. 
98 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, 15. 
99 Burcu Munyas, “Genocide in the minds of Cambodian youth: transmitting (hi)stories of 
genocide to second and third generations in Cambodia,” in Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 
3 (September 2008): 413-439, 418. 
	   40	  
A study published in 2008 on Cambodian youth found that many “families ‘try to 
forget’ [the genocide] by avoiding the subject” in conversation, books, movies, and 
everything else.100 Therefore, “very few youth” have discussed “why the genocide 
happened” in their homes; an ignorance very similar to Germany before Hannah Vogt 
published her school textbook.101 This silence is bad for two significant reasons. First, if 
the majority of Cambodians continue to be silent about their past, the youth will grow up 
being left in the dark, which will lead to many personal stories being lost forever as the 
first generation dies off.102 Second, communication is a remedy for trauma and PTSD, 
which many Cambodians suffer from to date.103 The fact that the genocide is excluded 
from the public school curricula because of its political sensitivity is not helpful.104 As of 
2004, Cambodians have constructed 78 memorials throughout the country. A map of 
Cambodia hung in Tuol Sleng marks the general vicinity of where all of these memorials 
are located. However, these memorials are small and not easily found. Many Cambodians 
do not know their whereabouts.105  
On January 7, 1979, less than four years after the Khmer Rouge took control of 
Phnom Penh, heavily fortified Vietnamese troops launched a massive offensive, severely 
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damaging Khmer Rouge power and taking over the capital.106 The army brought with it a 
select group of Vietnamese-trained Cambodian politicians, most of who had previously 
defected from the Khmer Rouge.107 This was the birth of a second revolution and a new 
regime – the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Whether this Vietnamese military 
coup was viewed as ”liberation” or as an “invasion” has been widely contested by 
Cambodians, and remains so to this day. David Chandler, in his book Voices from S-21, 
wrote that the Vietnamese troops “were welcomed by nearly everyone” who was still in 
Phnom Penh when they took control.108 While it would be nonsensical to argue that 
Cambodians were not happy to see their Khmer Rouge oppressors’ retreat, to claim that 
they “welcomed” the Vietnamese would be hyperbolic. Perhaps this was because 
Cambodians were now sobered and pessimistic from their mistakenly enthusiastic and 
hopeful response when the Khmer Rouge marched into Phnom Penh victorious. Or, 
perhaps they were tired from one regime replacing the last.  Either way, Cambodians did 
not simply throw themselves into the arms of these troops. While fleeing from Tuol 
Sleng, Chum Mey was shot at by two Vietnamese trucks. He was only able to escape by 
finding refuge with Khmer Rouge soldiers.109 He recalled in Thmat Porng that “people 
were not sleeping in their houses for fear of both Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge 
troops.”110 
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An article translated from Khmer in the New York Times made it clear that 
independence was of “the highest priority” for Cambodians.111 The author, Pheach Srey, 
was writing only 3 days after the Vietnamese takeover:  
The replacement of the Pol Pot regime by the Vietnamese troops on 
Khmer soil is comparable to an epidemic of the bubonic plague being 
eliminated only to be replaced by the scourge of cholera.112 
 
Srey continued, calling the PRK a “Communist puppet regime,” and declared that the 
only viable solution would be an internationally intervened democratic election.  Srey 
was certainly not alone in condemning the Vietnamese. On January 8th of 1979, just one 
day after the Vietnamese took over Phnom Penh, Prince Sihanouk publicly pleaded to the 
world in a press conference in Peking, asking to expel the Vietnamese from Cambodia.113 
Calling life under the Khmer Rouge “terrible,” the Prince adamantly condemned what he 
called the “Hitlerian Vietnamese aggressors,” declaring that an oppressive, nationalist 
government was better than a Vietnamese occupation.114 However, the Prince concluded 
his protest by acknowledging that the real fate of the Vietnamese in Cambodia rested in 
the opinion of the Cambodian masses.115  Of course, figures like Pheach Srey and Prince 
Sihanouk were writing and speaking from abroad, and their statements could easily be 
delegitimized as being highly politicized. However, there is not a source from this period 
that is not politicized. Either way, it remains clear that Cambodians – at best – skeptically 
received the Vietnamese, and the Cambodian Regime that they installed in power. 
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   With this contention between Cambodians and the Vietnamese in mind, the 
Vietnamese occupation created a unique and confusing beginning for genocide 
remembrance. On the one hand, the Vietnamese wanted to justify their invasion by 
exposing the Khmer Rouge, but on the other hand they had to incorporate the ex-Khmer 
Rouge Cadre into the new regime. This created a paradox similar to what Germany was 
beginning to experience. Cambodians were told that the Khmer Rouge had committed an 
awful crime, but they should forgive almost all of them.  
Almost immediately after the Vietnamese took control, they began to force-feed 
their narrative to the Cambodian people in order to justify the invasion. The narrative was 
straightforward and simple: the Khmer Rouge committed crimes against Cambodians 
parallel to that of the crimes of Nazis against the Jews, and the Vietnamese saved 
Cambodians from death and liberated them from oppression.116 The day after the 
Vietnamese took Phnom Penh, two photojournalists found Tuol Sleng by chance. Also 
known today as S-21, the top-secret interrogation prison was a center where 
approximately 20,000 Cambodians were tortured, and shipped off like sheep for 
slaughter.117 Immediately recognizing the immense “propaganda value” that such a 
horrific site could bring, Vietnamese commanders closed off the area and began 
preparing it for visitors.118  
 For the first year, the discovered prison was actually only open to foreign guests 
who were invited by the Vietnamese to witness the atrocities committed by the Khmer 
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Rouge.119 In fact, for months after the Vietnamese victory and the establishment of the 
PRK, Cambodians were blocked off from going into cities, like Phnom Penh and Siem 
Reap. These cities were transformed into military bases and also used by the new 
government while a hundred thousand Cambodians camped outside the cities with 
nowhere else to go.120 A Vietnamese Colonel, named Mia Lam, was commissioned by 
the Vietnamese to transform S-21 into a museum, and subsequently Choeung Ek into a 
Genocidal Center.121 Lam “approached his work with enthusiasm and pride,” and worked 
hard to tie comparisons between the Nazi death camps and the atrocities committed in S-
21.122 For example, the mass of exposed skulls and cases piled high of victims’ clothes at 
both Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek were techniques adopted from the death camps of 
Europe.123 In order to legitimize the said atrocities under the Khmer Rouge, Lam left the 
museum and memorial spaces largely untouched from when they were used as torture 
and killing centers.124 The focus was clearly on the massive killing of the Khmer Rouge 
and the horrendous methods they used to accomplish it.  
When Tuol Sleng was finally opened to Cambodians in July of 1980, tens of 
thousands of Cambodians flooded the museum hoping to find news on lost relatives, but 
also hoping to understand what had happened and find meaning.125 Instead of supplying 
an answer to the latter, the museum only reminded them of what they had suffered on a 
large scale.  The Khmer Rouge had left behind thousands of headshots of prisoners along 
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with written “confessions,” of victims that “proved” their collaboration with 
organizations like the CIA, KGB, and Vietnamese government.126 These confessions 
were compiled in designated rooms on the upper floors of the museum for special use and 
not on display for visitors to examine. However, after his visit to Tuol Sleng in August of 
1981, David Chandler pointed out that it was impossible to corroborate the veracity of 
nearly all of the confessions.127  
Instead of using the space as a way for Cambodians to remember and search for 
meaning, Lam and the Vietnamese continued to propagandize by establishing a national 
Day of Hate – officially designated for May 20th.128 On this day, Cambodians were 
required to gather at places where oppression had taken place, like Tuol Sleng and 
Choeung Ek, and listen to survivors recount the crimes committed by the Khmer 
Rouge.129 Paul Williams explains that the day was designed to “sustain an implacable 
hatred of the [Khmer Rouge].”130 The annual Hate Days officially lasted until 1991, not 
long after the Vietnamese fully withdrew from Cambodia.131  
Paul Williams writes that 1991 marked the moment when an “official reversal 
occurred,” and Cambodians were asked to forgive instead of hate. 132 This was followed 
by a series of shifts in the stance taken by the government between forgiving the Khmer 
Rouge cadres and fighting them. Other scholars such as Evan Gottesman write that from 
the beginning, the PRK regime promoted forgiveness to all Khmer Rouge cadres except 
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for Pol Pot and his immediate circle of top collaborators.133 It was unknown exactly 
whom would be considered so bad that they had to be brought to justice. The regime 
argued that it was necessary to exempt everyone except a few of the top leaders because 
many “former Khmer Rouge cadres and soldiers… were appointed to positions in the 
Party, the state apparatus, and the security forces.”134 It is irrelevant whether Williams or 
Gottesman was more accurate. Cambodians were receiving mixed messages from the 
new regime; they were told to hate the Khmer Rouge perpetrators and fight for justice 
while, at the same time, being told to forgive and move forward. 
Cambodians are detached from Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek because these sites 
were discovered, established, and propagandized by the Vietnamese, but also because 
they have been a source of the mixed messages between hate and forgiveness. David 
Chandler acknowledges that this has caused problems with the “authenticity” of the sites 
for many Cambodians.135  Furthermore, this Vietnamese force-fed narrative has left an 
impact of disbelief in second and third generation Cambodians.136 Part of the problem lies 
in the fact that Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek have seen little transformation since their 
establishment under Vietnamese occupation, over 3 decades ago. However, Choeung Ek 
has recently made some good additions that help form a more complete narrative. 
David Chandler’s account of Tuol Sleng when he visited in 1981 is remarkably 
similar to my own experience while visiting the museum in May of 2015. Chandler 
recalled his guided tour:  
We were first taken to small classrooms on the ground floor. We saw 
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ground floor rooms instruments of torture were displayed, alongside 
paintings by a survivor that depicted prisoners being interrogated, tortured, 
and killed. Hundreds of enlarged mug shots of prisoners were also posted 
on the walls. On the second floor we saw tiny cells assigned to prisoners 
being questioned and larger rooms where groups of less important captives 
were held.137 
 
Chandler also recalled having the history of the compound explained to him – it was once 
a high school – and also being shown the archival stacks left behind by the fleeing Khmer 
Rouge.138  
When I visited with my group in the spring of 2015, I remember the eerie 
quietness that surrounded the area around the museum in contrast to the rest of Phnom 
Penh, which was loud, overcrowded, and fast-paced. One could almost walk right past 
the museum without knowing what it was save for the simple sign over the entrance 
which read in both English and Khmer: “Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum.” The place still 
held the eerie resemblance of the high school it once was, which was one of the first 
topics mentioned on our tour. Once inside, my group and I were lucky enough to have a 
walking tour with a man named Lundi. After Lundi gave us some context and explained 
his own story, he took us around into rooms that matched Chandler’s account exactly. 
Some rooms had beds and photographs. Other rooms were lined with torture equipment, 
paintings, and hundreds of enlarged mug shots. Lundi showed the same contrast between 
the larger rooms for less important prisoners and the smaller, individual cells for those 
who were deemed more of a “threat.” Over the course of three and half decades, the 
museum still had the message left behind by Mia Lam and the Vietnamese, which 
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focused on the scale and technique of the murder. There was very little on the display to 
help visitors understand the genocide. 
My visit to Tuol Sleng did differ from Chandler’s in three important aspects. 
Chandler and his team were able to dig through archives left behind by the Khmer Rouge 
soldiers. These archives have since been safely stored and microfilmed by Cornell 
University in the early 90’s.139 The second noteworthy difference was a fairly dominant 
stone memorial that had been erected in the back of the museum in the middle of a 
courtyard. It resembled the shape of a stupa, and on the side there was an inscription in 
gold letters on black polished stone that read: “Never will we forget the crimes 
committed during the Democratic Kampuchea regime.” This is a clear tie to Holocaust 
remembrance. Nevertheless, in doing so it complimented the preexisting narrative curated 
by Mia Lam whose agenda was to draw parallels between the two genocides in order to 
legitimize it to a foreign audience.  
 
Memorial stupa for victims of S-21 (photo taken by author on May 10, 2015). 	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The last difference to note was the presence of survivor Chum Mey himself. He 
had a table on the side of the museum with a display of various books and films on the 
genocide, and he was an official stop on the tour. Here Lundi translated as Chum Mey 
explained his horrific experience as a prisoner. He talked about having had suicidal 
thoughts, being crammed into a tiny brick cell for days on end, and the routine 
interrogations where he was often tortured. He also explained his trauma, how for years 
he was unable to come back to the place without breaking down in tears. Ultimately, he 
realized his potential to teach others his experience so it would not be forgotten. Teaching 
the youth, he explained, made returning to S-21 bearable – even enjoyable. He now 
spends his days there talking to foreigners and locals alike. Chum Mey provides a level of 
meaning that the rest of the museum lacks. However, the museum exhibitions have 
undergone little adaptation from how they were established in 1980 by the Vietnamese. It 
has an overwhelming focus on the scale and methods of death, but fails to interpret or 
form any understanding of the atrocity. 
On the other hand, Choeung Ek Genocidal Center has undergone a degree of 
development over time, and has tried to include an element of meaning to the atrocity. 
Discovered by the Vietnamese around the same time as Tuol Sleng, the first step was 
excavating a select number of mass graves and determining the extent of the death. Out 
of 129 mass graves discovered, 43 were left buried; 8,985 skeletons were found.140 In 
1988, a huge 36-meter high memorial “elongated stupa,” designed by Lim Ourk, was 
erected in the middle of the field, which holds many of the bones that were excavated in  
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Memorial stupa at Choeung Ek (photo taken by  
author on May 11, 2015). 
 
 
 
Bones protruding from the ground at Choeung Ek (photo taken  
by author on May 11, 2015).  
The remains of victims inside the memorial  
stupa (photo taken by author on May 11, 
2015). 
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1980.141 Once inside the stupa, the viewer is presented a tall glass case, totaling 17 levels, 
which contain over 8,000 skulls and other major human bones. On each individual skull, 
one can easily identify the crack where the victim was fatally hit over the head. The smell 
of death still permeates through the glass case. Although dominating, the memorial stupa 
is by no means the only thing to see. Visitors were, and still are, encouraged to walk 
around and see the excavated graves. Perhaps most shocking was the discovery of a 
particular tree where executioners would kill small children and babies by swinging them 
against its trunk. While walking around, visitors are asked to be careful, as it is quite easy 
to accidently step on protruding bones that are constantly being exposed by weather and 
erosion. One could only imagine the effect Choeung Ek had on participants during the 
national Day of Hate, which was celebrated at the time. 
Since Paul Williams wrote about Choeung Ek, two significant developments have 
taken place. First was the installation of a self-guided audio tour, which adds personal 
stories to the mass killing. Offered in 15 languages, the audio tour guide, Ros Kosal, 
begins by introducing himself as a survivor of the genocide. Kosal explains how much of 
his family was lost during the Khmer Rouge years. They are presumed dead but were 
never discovered. Kosal and his remaining family will never know what happened to 
those whom they lost. The tour continues to take the visitor around the area explaining 
the killing processes and how many were murdered there, while also dipping into 
personal stories and witnessed accounts of the time. By attaching stories to the bones, the 
genocide center makes a good faith attempt at providing meaning to the horrors.  
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A second significant development was the creation of a new museum in 2008 set 
off to the side of the killing fields.142 The museum gives visitors context on the 
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime by showcasing some items used and playing a 
video about the period on loop. But the most remarkable aspect of the museum, which 
arguably makes it a better place of memory than Tuol Sleng, is that it incorporated the 
Khmer Rouge tribunal into the narrative and memory of the genocide. 
 The PRK regime actually conducted a People’s Revolutionary tribunal – with 
Vietnamese supervision – in 1979, shortly after its establishment. Its purpose was to 
“convince the world of Pol Pot’s crimes and promote the legitimacy of the PRK.”143 
However, the trial, which lasted for four days, ended up just being a show that amounted 
to no real results; the only individuals put on trial were Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.144 Since 
they were not in the government’s custody, neither showed up to the trial and their 
convictions were in absentia. The government went to lengths reassuring former Khmer 
Rouge cadres that they were not at risk of being put on trial.145 Some Khmer Rouge 
cadres were handed short jail sentences, which were entirely based on their “attitude 
toward the new regime and on their value to the ongoing military campaign.”146 The 
whole purpose of it was to legitimize the Vietnamese invasion and prove to the world that 
Pol Pot attempted genocide. It goes without saying that this did not help Cambodians 
achieve justice. The trial had little to do with them in the first place. 
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 When the Vietnamese left in 1989, Cambodia underwent major national changes 
to distinguish the government as a truly new, independent power. Buddhism was 
reinstated as the state religion and the name of the state was changed to the State of 
Cambodia (SOC); even the flag and the national anthem were replaced with new, non-
ideological expressions.147 The government even rejected communism and adopted 
democracy. However, peace still had not been achieved. The world met in Paris in 1991 
to discuss how the four major Cambodian factions would come to a peaceful agreement, 
one being the remaining forces of the Khmer Rouge.148 This was received with meager 
hope, at best. An article written in the Phnom Penh Post a year after the peace agreement 
called out the Khmer Rouge for failing to “lay down their arms and cooperate with the 
peace process.”149 The Khmer Rouge continued to be a player in Cambodian politics until 
1998 when an inner faction destroyed the group. Pol Pot was abandoned by his own 
people, sentenced to a lifetime house arrest in a People’s Trial, and died soon afterwards. 
He died “without having taken responsibility or been held accountable for the death of 
more than 1.6 million Cambodians.”150 The fact that Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge had 
remained in the political and international scene for over two decades, even after their 
crimes against the nation were exposed to the world, explains why Cambodians have 
struggled to develop an appropriate way to remember the genocide.   
 Under the new government, Prime Minister Hun Sen, who had defected from the 
Khmer Rouge in the ‘70s and had been a key player in the PRK regime during the 
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Vietnamese occupation, made a political alliance with the seasoned Prince Sihanouk – 
appointing him as head of state. Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk began to entertain the idea 
of welcoming an international tribunal, which could bring justice to Cambodians. 
However, the government had to be careful not to widen the scope of convictions too 
much. Many government officials had previously been aligned with the Khmer Rouge. In 
2006, after years of hesitancy and second-guessing, this idea became a reality. 
 A quarter of a century after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia entered the 
current phase of remembrance: seeking justice for the genocide. This took form in the 
establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) – a 
hybrid court, co-adjudicated by Cambodia and the UN.151 However, the formation of this 
unique hybrid court was not easy. There was disagreement over everything from where 
the trials should take place to who can be put on trial. For the Cambodian government, 
the tribunal has run into an ongoing national tug of war between achieving justice and 
peace. This has resulted in very few convictions of former Khmer Rouge leaders, let 
alone indictments. No one has been convicted on charges of genocide; those found guilty 
have been charged with crimes against humanity. However, a second element could be at 
play here – the hesitancy to put the fate of Cambodians under the jurisdiction of an 
international court.  
At best, Prime Minister Hun Sen has taken a wishy-washy stance on the tribunal. 
On one hand, Hun Sen has shown support for trying the Khmer Rouge. In response to 
claims that he had repeatedly changed his mind about seeking retribution, Hun Sen 
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retorted that he had “insisted again and again… to bring KR leaders to justice.”152 In 
February of 1999, he was quoted in The Phnom Penh Post clearly stating that justice is 
needed to keep peace:  
There is a risk if [KR accountability] is not addressed in Cambodia, that 
this will sow the seeds of unrest in the future. Therefore there is no 
conflict [between justice and peace] in principle… One does not secure 
peace by ignoring crimes of this magnitude in the long run.153   
 
He had even reportedly made a list of “eight to ten” former Khmer Rouge leaders that he 
believed should be prosecuted in a trial.154  
On the other hand, Hun Sen had lunch with two top leaders from the former 
regime, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, only a few months before his adamant 
declaration for justice. Upon their arrival, he publicly declared that the two men should 
be greeted “with bouquets of flowers.”155 He has also stated that Cambodia “should dig a 
hole and bury the past and look ahead to the 21st century with a clean slate.”156 This is a 
polar opposite view from his earlier stance. This side of Hun Sen separates peace from 
justice, describing the tribunal as poking at an old wound.157 Hun Sen’s inconsistent 
statements reveal his hesitancy. He clearly has been worried about justice jeopardizing 
peace, and therefore harming his political stability. 
The Cambodian government’s resistance to an international tribunal has caused 
the proceedings to hit a series of bumps in the road. Progress is being achieved, but at a 
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creeping pace. This is so because both the international and Cambodian professionals 
must approve any decisions made by the court.158 The UN has pushed for more 
indictments while the Cambodian government has supported only a few; the consensus is 
that only “the most senior and most responsible” Khmer Rouge leaders would be 
indicted.159 After much deliberation, which almost ended in the court disbanding, some 
agreements were made on who could be indicted. However, both sides still had their own 
interpretation of that phrase. 
To date, three ex-Khmer Rouge leaders have been convicted, the maximum 
sentence being life imprisonment. Kaing Guek Eav, known as Duch, was the 
commandant of the S-21 interrogation prison; he was given a life sentence in February of 
2012.160 In case 002, which tried four senior leaders: Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng 
Sary, and Ieng Thirith, only Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were given lifetime 
sentences. They were convicted in August of 2014.161 Ieng Sary died in March of 2013, 
and Ieng Thirith was released on grounds that she was “unfit to stand trial.”162 There are 
currently three more indicted persons awaiting trial; in total 8 individuals have been 
charged to date.163 So far none of the defendants have been charged with genocide.164 
It is hard to say if the tribunal has given Cambodians their badly needed justice. If 
it has, it could lead to a new phase of commemoration – one that is not at odds with 	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peace. When Duch was put on trial, survivor Chum Mey testified against him. Duch was 
originally sentenced to 35 years in jail before the higher court extended it to a life 
sentence in 2012.165 Duch’s original sentence “wouldn’t have been justice,” according to 
Chum Mey.166 Three years later, Chum Mey believes that the trials have fulfilled their job 
at achieving justice and should end. He explained that “the past is the past; [Cambodia] 
must focus on the children and educating them.”167 If the tribunal does not stop now, 
where would it end? 
As mentioned above, Cambodian youth have not been receiving an in-depth 
education on the genocide.168 The opening line of an article in The Phnom Penh Post, 
written in 2000, stated, “the Khmer Rouge rule of 1975-1979 practically doesn’t exist” in 
textbooks.169 There are brief sections mentioned about the period, particularly in high 
schools, but this is not enough. Youth are graduating with very little knowledge about the 
genocide. The article explores how youth cannot recall basic facts about the Khmer 
Rouge period when questioned, like how many people had died. The students who did 
have a decent level of understanding about the genocide learned from sources outside of 
their classrooms.170 However, education on the Killing Fields has seen some recent 
changes. An article in The Phnom Penh Post, written in April of 2015, gives some insight 
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on this transformation.171 The article states that the Ministry of Education has addressed 
the topic of genocide remembrance, but the educational system still lacks “critical 
genocide studies.”172 In other words, the educational system lacks a deep understanding 
of how genocide happens and why across the globe.  
Kheang Un concludes that the Khmer Rouge tribunal has served as a tool for 
knowledge in Cambodia.173 The trials have resurfaced history, uncovered new 
information, and forced the topic of genocide into public discourse. Yet, a majority of 
Cambodians today were born after the fall of the Khmer Rouge and only 6% of them 
have reported learning about the genocide in school.174 The future looks optimistic, 
though, with an overwhelming majority of Cambodians supporting the tribunal and 
wanting to learn the truth.175  
Although compromised to a degree, places of memory such as Tuol Sleng, 
Choeung Ek, and the ongoing Khmer Rouge tribunal are indeed promoting remembrance 
in Cambodia. This paints a positive picture for the future. In addition to these sites there 
have been some successful organizations in Cambodia that focus on remembering the 
genocide. The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) has collected and archived 
hundreds of thousands of documents for the Khmer Rouge period and trained thousands 
of teachers how to educate youth on the genocide.176 The Ksaem Ksan foundation, also 
called the Association of Victims of Democratic Kampuchea, was founded by a group of 
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survivors – Chum Mey among them – to help victims in any way possible. Founded in 
2010, the foundation aims to create “reconciliation between victims and perpetrators,” 
and support the work being done in the tribunal.177 These are just two examples of 
significant organizations making positive strives.  
However, there is still need for improvement. Genocide remembrance is largely 
constrained to places like Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek. The two largest national museums 
in Siem Reap and Phnom Penh do not even mention the Khmer Rouge period. The 
museum in Siem Reap concludes with the fall of the ancient and mighty Angkor Empire; 
the museum in Phnom Penh addresses the French colonial phase but goes no further. The 
Killing Fields are separated from Cambodia’s history. Additionally, more tourists go to 
Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek than Cambodians. Inside the center, Choeung Ek posts the 
number of visitors and where they are from for each month. In January of 2015, out of 
the 28,000 visitors less than 2,000 were Cambodians. Tuol Sleng was receiving on 
average 50 visitors a day in 2003.178 This shows that these sites are not encouraging the 
nation to remember. James Young would probably find this unsurprising. Young sees 
monuments as a way to “relieve viewers of their memory burden.”179 Once they are built, 
they do the job of remembering and people can move on knowing that monuments are 
taking care of the responsibility. Of course, these places are not easy to visit for 
Cambodians. The bones of their friends, family, and people are on display there. It could 
be that many Cambodians do visit these sites, but they do so once, twice, or very rarely 
while the endless stream of tourist pour in day after day. This could overshadow the 
degree to which locals visit. Also, until the recent indictments from the tribunal, these 	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spaces were reminders that justice had not been delivered, making it more painful for 
Cambodians to visit. The works of organizations listed above are trying to create a more 
public memory of the genocide, but their impacts are limited. Public commemoration and 
national memorialization will remain constrained as long as the government continues to 
separate Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, from the national history. 
This chapter has examined how the genocide has been memorialized in Cambodia 
over time. It has explored how Cambodians have been primed against remembrance; the 
Cambodian masses have been expected to act as “pawns” to the small, removed elite 
class since the times of the Angkor Empire, which continued through the Khmer Rouge 
period. Cambodians also struggle to understand and comprehend the atrocities committed 
under the Khmer Rouge. The result is that many Cambodians hide from their past. This 
has translated down to second and third generation Cambodians, which puts memory at 
risk of being lost. After the fall of the Khmer Rouge came another problem: the 
Vietnamese occupation. It was the Vietnamese, and the subsequent “puppet” PRK 
regime, that forced a narrative on Cambodians that justified the invasion. This created the 
tensions between peace and justice that continue haunting the nation to this day. 
Genocide remembrance in Cambodia is improving. The juxtaposition between peace and 
justice is diminishing. This is largely to the credit of the tribunal and the hard work of 
non-government organizations. However, there is still a long road until the genocide is no 
longer at risk of being altogether forgotten.  	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Striking Similarities out of Stark Differences 
This thesis has conducted an in-depth analysis of the history and memorialization 
of each genocide. Now it will thoroughly analyze the Holocaust and killing fields by 
examining the respective similarities and differences between them. This is looked at 
through the actual genocides and how each has been memorialized. While the genocides 
themselves are logistically very dissimilar, it is important to analyze some major themes 
that emerge despite such stark differences. These themes appear by examining how 
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders dealt with their genocides respectively. In both 
cases, the world was warned of the situation, but failed to act effectively. Also in both 
cases, the perpetrators were able to mobilize their followers to do their bidding by 
harnessing and distorting the cultures of their country. This has given rise to identical 
struggles with early memorialization of the genocides. However, over time the victims 
and perpetrators of Holocaust have proved more successful at commemoration than 
Cambodians. Comparing and contrasting these two very different genocides show that 
mass murders have eerily common themes and similarities despite that fact that one is 
remembered much more successfully than the other.  
On the outset, the actual Cambodian and Jewish genocides seem to share few 
similarities. They took place on different continents, in different decades, and for 
different reasons. The Khmer Rouge forced Cambodians to spread out across Cambodia 
and work the land; the Nazis rounded up Jews into confined work camps. The Nazis 
gassed Jews; the Khmer Rouge cracked skulls and cut throats. The Holocaust was one 
event within the broader context of the Second World War while the Khmer Rouge was a 
byproduct of the Cold War. The Cambodian genocide took place all within Cambodia; 
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the Holocaust engulfed Europe and spread as far as Shanghai, China.180 Hitler came to 
power in January of 1933 and remained until 1945, while Pol Pot’s men took power in 
1975 and only remained so until 1979. The differences between the two genocides are so 
stark that an argument could be made against comparing them in the first place.   
Yet, while the two genocides were totally different in detail, they share two major 
themes that make comparison a productive exercise. The first common theme is the 
tactics used by the main leadership of the perpetrators. Both the Nazi and Khmer Rouge 
leadership used rhetoric and secrecy to promulgate hatred that led to murder. The second 
theme is how the rest of the world received and responded to the pleas for help. During 
both the Holocaust and the Killing Fields the world was at best ignorant of, and at worst 
ignored, the horrendous crimes against humanity. These themes must be analyzed to 
better understand how the genocides continue to be remembered, commemorated, and 
dealt with today. Understanding these repetitions also helps answer the question: how 
could this happen?  
There is a stark difference in the relationship between the Nazis and Jews, and the 
Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian masses. In Cambodia, the killing was concentrated in 
Khmer murdering Khmer, whereas during the Holocaust Germans were focused mostly 
on targeting Jews. This comes down to the Killing Fields being class-based and the 
Holocaust race-based. However, analyzing the tactics and rhetoric that the Nazi and 
Khmer Rouge used to promote mass killing reveals a striking similarity between the two. 
This is important to analyze because it has heavily influenced how both genocides are 
understood – or not understood.  	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The rhetoric that the Nazi leadership used against the Jews can be found easily in 
the enormous amount of documentation that the Third Reich so meticulously kept. On the 
other hand, the rhetoric of the Khmer Rouge leadership is scarce in comparison. Yet, it is 
apparent that both Hitler and Pol Pot used anger and secrecy to promote their agendas to 
their followers. However, Hitler went much further with rhetoric than Pol Pot, who put a 
stronger emphasis on secrecy and discipline. A people are effectively dehumanized when 
it becomes okay for them to be killed for no reason other than that the opportunity 
presented itself – similar to squashing a bug on the sidewalk. When this happens they 
cease being “people” in the eyes of the perpetrators. Whether a stronger emphasis was 
put on rhetoric or blind obedience, both were used to foster genocide.  
Hitler’s rhetoric was so successful because anti-Semitism was already prevalent 
within Germany long before he came to power. Anti-Semitism in Germany really dates 
back to the 14th century when Jews were blamed for spreading the Bubonic plague.181 
They were consistently discriminated against and treated with suspicion for centuries – 
sometimes expelled from their homes, barred from public life, or heavily taxed. Even 
when a disproportionate number of Jews served in the German army during World War I, 
many Germans blamed them for sitting on the sidelines and avoiding active duty.182 This 
sort of racism was absent amongst the Khmer who were all the same ethnicity. Instead, 
Pol Pot harnessed Cambodia’s strict hierarchal culture of obedience to control his 
followers.183 This culture was deeply rooted in Cambodian society well before Pol Pot. In 
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fact, when Cambodia first fell to the Khmer Rouge 81 Lon Nol soldiers were studying in 
the United States. Cindy Coleman, who was in charge of these new refugees, recalled 
how the soldiers would not even decide on their lunch “without [first] asking their 
supervisors.”184 Pol Pot exploited this submission, spreading maxims like: “When Angkar 
gives orders, carry them out to the letter.”185 The Khmer Rouge event twisted traditional 
phrases like “know how to plant a Kapok tree,” which implied that one should know 
when to keep quiet.186 While Germans were first and foremost primed to hate Jews, 
Cambodians were similarly primed to blindly follow orders and obey superiors.187 
Hitler’s rhetoric can be broken down into two aspects: one blaming the Jews for 
German problems, which casted them as outsiders, and the other portraying them as less 
than human and worthless. It was the former tactic that led to the latter, which justified 
the slaughter of millions of Jews in many German eyes. One of Hitler’s most 
remembered quotes, which he repeated in numerous speeches, blamed the Jews for 
bringing war to Europe and threatened “the annihilation of the Jewish race” if another 
war broke out.188 This quote even made it into the anti-Semitic propaganda film, The 
Eternal Jew.189 Hans Mommsen argues that when Hitler originally made this statement, it 	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was more to pressure the rest of Europe and America to take in more Jews than it was a 
serious threat to their lives.190 Even if Mommsen is correct in applying the political 
context of the time to understand Hitler’s intentions, the fact that the majority of Germans 
received his words as no big deal reveals the anti-Semitic cultural normalization by 1939.  
Blaming Jews enabled Germans to hate them as outsiders, but it was really the 
rhetoric that portrayed Jews as sub-human that enabled killing to take place on such a 
massive scale with such disregard. Art Spiegelman portrays this element best in his 
acclaimed Holocaust graphic novel, Maus, by depicting Jews as mice, Germans as cats, 
Poles as Pigs, and so on. When characters hide their identities they wear masks, but they 
never actually transform into the species they are pretending to be – they are inherently 
different. The underlying message that the Nazi leadership gave to SS soldiers was that 
Jews should be persecuted for having Jewish blood. A striking example of this can be 
found in a report of a cycle battalion: “282 Jews were shot. During the action one Pole 
was shot for looting.”191 No reason was necessary for the death of hundreds of Jews, but 
one Polish death required explanation. However, what does demand explanation is when 
Jews are not killed, usually because their skills or labor were of immediate service.192 
This report was of course classified, as were most reports that involved killing; it reveals 
that within the Nazi ranks, killing Jews was treated as routine. The Nazi leadership often 
masked murder in secrecy, but not always. While the German public was often kept in 
the dark, the indigenous people who were living abroad, where most of the killings took 
place, would occasionally be privy to executions. In countries like Ukraine and Poland 	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public hangings and shootings did take place. One example of this was in Zhitomir, 
Ukraine, in the summer of 1941. A technical battalion truck driver recalled how the 
murder of about 50 Jews was broadcasted and turned into a spectacle. Soldiers sat on 
rooftops to get a good view because roughly 150 civilians had gathered around to 
watch.193  
Of course, not every soldier enjoyed killing Jews, and often these killings took 
place in secluded areas. The murders put an immense strain on many, which made 
secrecy and obedience necessary for the Nazi leadership to achieve killing on such a 
massive scale. The Milgram experiment in 1961 showed how prone many people are to 
following commanding orders without resisting much, even when they were morally 
against hurting another human. A war correspondent that witnessed shootings in Latvia 
noticed how some soldiers cried while others “kept a score-sheet” of their hits when 
ordered to kill Jews.194 Often times soldiers who were sent to killing squads did not have 
a real choice; it was either shoot, be shot, or commit suicide.195 These death pits were not 
easily accessible; special permits were required to enter these areas.196 It is interesting to 
note that this polarization amongst soldiers is not an anomaly – similar reports were made 
in the American army during the Vietnamese War, most notably with the My Lai 
massacre.197     
The separation between victims and perpetrators becomes blurred in the context 
of the Cambodian genocide. Here, both the perpetrators and the overwhelming majority 
of victims were Khmer. Pol Pot and his top commanders did foster hatred against the 	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urban, wealthy, and educated class, but these victims were still perceived as Cambodians. 
Dehumanization was used to a much lesser degree than the Nazis, and it was 
concentrated in the prisons, which shrouded it in secrecy. A commonly used tactic was to 
speak towards the victims using pronouns that one would use for slaves, animals, and 
objects.198 A more severe dehumanizing method, which was actually considered to be a 
type of interrogation act, would be to force victims to pay homage to pictures of dogs and 
inanimate objects.199   
There were also hundreds of common sayings that the Khmer Rouge cadre 
repeated to enforce their dominance and eagerness to kill. For example, one widespread 
quote equated the importance to farm with the importance to kill: “One hand grasps a 
hoe, the other, a rifle.”200 Perhaps the most repeated phrase that Cambodian victims heard 
was: “No gain in keeping, no loss in weeding out.”201 This reinforced their worthlessness 
to the new order of society. Even the sick were looked upon with contempt and suspicion 
as “victims of their own imagination.”202  While this rhetoric certainly widened the 
hierarchal gap between the Khmer Rouge and their victims they did not go as far as the 
Nazis had with their dehumanization of Jews.  
The leadership recruited Cambodians who were angry for reasons like their 
economic status, but they also targeted those who were angry for a multitude of reasons: 
mainly the ongoing civil war, American B-52 bombings, and foreign invasion.203 It is 
important to consider how uneducated the Khmer Rouge soldiers were to understand how 	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Pol Pot was able to mobilize them against city dwellers. Reports from April 17, when the 
soldiers marched into Phnom Penh, described how the soldiers were perplexed by the 
items they encountered in Phnom Penh:  
The young peasant soldiers appeared puzzled and surprised by what they 
found in the city. One could not find a way to open a can of beer; another 
inspected an aerosol deodorant spray can a long time before giving it a 
wallop and throwing it aside. Some made fires on the hoods of 
automobiles to cook their rice.204 
 
These soldiers saw “good” Cambodians as people who could work and live off of 
the land, not those who emulated a western lifestyle of luxury.  
The most important tactic that Pol Pot used to promote genocide was secrecy, 
more so than fostering anger or dehumanizing his victims. Secrecy was always the 
priority.205 Places like Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek were so secret that they were not even 
referred to by name in documentation.206 The Khmer Rouge had their own secret police 
called the Santebal, who spared no one who was suspect of anti-revolutionary activity.207 
Pol Pot created this intense level of secrecy by using Cambodia’s cultural social 
hierarchy and taking advantage of his uneducated soldiers. His cadre had to follow orders 
blindly – they were not allowed to participate in the politics of the regime. One 
Frenchman who remained in Phnom Penh as it was being evacuated in 1975 observed: “I 
felt their fighting spirit and ability came more from the rough discipline… they seemed 
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like animals being led into the field by the master.”208 There were no questioning or 
understanding orders, only obedience.  
At a general level the Holocaust can be understood as one nation killing a people 
out of racial hatred. While it is hard for the typical reader to understand why race could 
justify persecution and extermination, the concept is far from foreign. On the other hand, 
the Cambodian genocide is much harder to understand within Khmer culture because it 
was a single ethnicity systematically killing their brethren. A civil war is a delicate 
subject for a nation, which requires a lot of effort to recover from. Imagine how much 
more sensitive and difficult it becomes when one group commits a civil genocide. For the 
same reasons, German Jews who had fully assimilated into German society and had 
fought in the Great War took longest to understand what was happening to them. 
Analyzing the tactics that Hitler and Pol Pot used to convince one group to systematically 
slaughter the other reveals how banal genocide really is. It forces the reader to not see 
these atrocities as anomalies or special circumstances, but instead exposes genocide as an 
act attainable by merely exploiting a culture in the right way. 
The second major theme that the Holocaust and the Killing Fields shared was the 
ignorance that foreign powers displayed while the situation began to escalate into 
genocide. This topic is important to analyze because of the larger implications that this 
repeated failure to act adds to genocide studies. The world’s failure to act, not once but 
twice, can be seen through the present lens as abominable. It is important not to make the 
mistake of holding people responsible for having the historian’s knowledge. However, 
the Allies’ sheer unwillingness to act, matched with their alarming knowledge about the 	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magnitude of the problem before it was too late, diminishes the aforementioned 
precaution. It is important to analyze such apathy because it shows just how difficult it is 
for a nation to set aside its own interests for the interests of another. Two clear examples 
of this failure to help can be seen in the ineffectiveness of the Evian Conference in July 
of 1938 and the prolonged support that the Khmer Rouge received in the UN. In both 
cases, America actually enabled more killings to take place because of the government’s 
failure to act. 
The Evian Conference was an international initiative by President Roosevelt to 
solve the growing refugee problem of Jews trying to leave Germany with nowhere to go. 
Despite the goodwill effort put forth by the representation of 32 nations, nothing concrete 
materialized beyond the formation of an intergovernmental committee that continued 
dialogue with few results. Representatives expressed sorrow and alarm, but were 
unwilling to take on large numbers of Jewish refugees.209 Around the same time that the 
committee was failing to pass any soluble legislation, Germany was still willing to 
release Jews from concentration camps permitted that they had a visa to enter another 
country.210 This policy was no secret – the New York Times reported on the subject.211 
Furthermore, the potential impact of the conference and subsequent committee were 
compromised before either ever took place. The American and British governments made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Clarence K. Streit, "HUGE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS REVEALED AT EVIAN," in the New 
York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 10, 1938. 
210 Otto D. Tolischus, “Reich Orders Out Jews it Released: they must emigrate within next two 
months of race return to the camps,” in the New York Times, April 26, 1939.  
211 Tolischus, “Reich Orders Out Jews it Released.” 
	   71	  
an agreement prior to the Evian gathering that neither party would pressure the other to 
revise existing policies in order to accept more refugees.212  
In America this was enforced by upholding the Johnson-Reed immigration act of 
1924-1929. This law not only privileged people emigrating from certain areas more than 
others, but also required these people to be financially stable and in good standing with 
their respective governments.213 For Britain, the Palestine Mandate was politically 
sensitive. The adoption of the White Papers a year later imposed even more stringent 
emigration laws for Jews trying to enter.214 Thus, the British representative at the Evian 
Conference and for the subsequent committee, Lord Winterton, made no mention of 
Palestine as a part of the solution when he remarked that Britain would “with utmost 
sympathy and desire to collaborate, examine any suggestions… promoting a lasting 
settlement” for the Jewish refugees.215 In these respects, the conference was already 
severely limited in what it could accomplish before it even began. 
Unlike the Nazis, who tried to push Jews out before resorting to killing them, the 
Khmer Rouge closed the doors to Cambodia shortly after taking power in April of 1975 
leaving the world uninformed about what was happening.216 There was essentially a 
communications “blackout,” as a front page New York Times article put it. 217 However, at 
the same time the world was not left totally in the dark as to what the situation was like 	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under the new communist regime. Both the US government and the public were receiving 
grave reports from escaped refugees, which only grew worse as time passed.  
Perhaps most important were the reports that the US government was receiving 
from Charles Twining – the political officer deployed to Cambodia, but stuck in Thailand 
since the Khmer Rouge was not letting in any foreigners.218 Twining gathered his 
information from the few refugees who managed to escape over the border, and his 
reports became grimmer as time went on. After learning about rampant disease, frequent 
public executions, exceptionally high death rates amongst children, and the dead being 
thrown into mass graves, Twining wrote back to Washington in dismay: “This can’t be 
possible in this day and age. This is not 1942. This is 1975.”219 He was not the only one 
to be reminded of the Nazis’ treatment of Jews. A first-term New York congressman 
named Stephen Solarz visited Twining on an official trip in the fall of 1976. He was also 
struck by what seemed like “another Holocaust.”220 Solarz was able to initiate a 
congressional hearing in 1977 where Twining amongst others gave horrific testimonies 
on the situation in Cambodia, but the topic died on the House floor – no resolutions were 
passed to address these human rights violations.221 
While the press had little access to what was happening in Cambodia while the 
Khmer Rouge were in power, the public was not totally ignorant of the killings and 
political turmoil. There was significantly less reporting between the spring of 1975 and 
the end of 1978, but there were reports. For example, when around 300 Cambodians were 
shot down for trying to escape into Thailand in July of 1975 the story was reported in 5 	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major newspapers.222 Even more striking was the decision of the United Nations, heavily 
influenced by America, to continue to allow the Khmer Rouge to represent Cambodia for 
15 years after the Vietnamese threw them from power.223 It was a gigantic slap in the face 
to Holocaust memory and Cambodia when United States President, Jimmy Carter, 
famously said in September of 1979, “out of our memory… of the Holocaust we must 
forge an unshakable oath… that never again will the world stand silent, never again will 
the world… fail to act in time to prevent this terrible crime of genocide.”224 By this time, 
the world knew the full extent of what the Khmer Rouge had done; yet the perpetrators 
were allowed to represent their victims on the world stage for a decade and a half after 
the Vietnamese pushed them out of power. Furthermore, hundreds of millions of 
American dollars was secretly financing the Khmer Rouge.225 This happened after the 
mass killings were confirmed; there was no more guessing or mystery as to what 
happened in Cambodia while they had been in power. America was too worried about the 
Vietnamese invasion to care about dying refugees. The Vietnamese War was still a fresh 
scar in American memory, and the invasion was also viewed as an aggressive move in the 
context of the Cold War. 
While the differences in detail vastly outnumber the similarities between the two 
genocides, the Holocaust and the Killing Fields share many more glaring similarities than 
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differences in how they are remembered and commemorated. Remarkably, they both 
follow a very similar historiographical timeline in how they are memorialized 
immediately after the war. However, as time progressed, the world began to confront the 
Holocaust better than it has done with the killing fields. For both genocides, immediately 
after liberation third party occupiers began to develop a narrative that victims and 
perpetrators were expected to adopt. In both cases those involved struggled to publicly 
remember and commemorate. The past was too painful and too recent for the victims and 
perpetrators to simply start commemorating. This was not so for the rest of the world, 
which was shocked by the death and destruction that had taken place.  
The German and Cambodian people were force-fed a narrative by their occupiers 
immediately after the war. For Germany this was accomplished through the 
transformation of concentration camps like Dachau and Buchenwald, and for Cambodia 
the Vietnamese used S-21 and Choeung Ek. Concentration camps like Dachau and 
Buchenwald were inside Germany, and places where tens of thousands of Jews were 
forced to as the losing Germans retreated from Poland.226 The fact that so much 
persecution and death had taken place at these sites makes them extremely sensitive and 
traumatic to both the perpetrators and victims respectively. The major difference between 
them is that while S-21 and Choeung Ek are in the heart of Cambodia – in the capital 
itself, most of the extermination committed by the Nazis was done abroad in Poland. This 
makes the mass killings more foreign to Germans, especially as the Nazi generation dies 
out, whereas in Cambodia the sunken earth of mass graves and physical protrusion of 
bones stand out like a hideous garden in the heart of the nation. While these people were 	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struggling to confront these sensitive sites, those who were neither the perpetrators nor 
victims seized these places for their own narrative and forced it upon them.  
When the Americans liberated concentration camps like Dachau and Buchenwald 
they set up makeshift memorials and actually marched Germans through to witness 
them.227 Buchenwald was then handed over to Soviet control a few years later as part of 
the division between East and West Germany and the two camps developed different 
narratives. In Dachau, the American troops set up memorials, fenced off the crematoria, 
and displayed pictures of German aggression and dying victims.228 This narrative – that 
American troops put a stop to German evil crimes – led to local German protests that 
claimed the exhibits were insensitive and detrimental to developing future relations with 
the world.229 In Buchenwald, the Soviets presented a narrative of self-liberation by 
German communists.230 By turning the camp into a type of German victimization rather 
than German perpetration, the Soviets encouraged camps to be left as they had looked at 
liberation. It symbolized a new German birth out from the ashes of the old. While both 
Dachau and Buchenwald were under American and Soviet occupation, the American 
narrative focused on German defeat by U.S. troops whereas the Soviet narrative fostered 
German self-liberation. 
When the Vietnamese discovered S-21 and, subsequently, Choeung Ek they 
immediately saw potential to justify their invasion. Mia Lam, the Vietnamese colonel 
designated to oversee the museum’s development, had the example of the Holocaust at 
his disposal when he set out to memorialize the prison and killing fields. He modeled his 	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exhibits of death off of those that commemorated the Holocaust. Like the Americans, 
Lam projected his nation as the liberators of Cambodian oppression, but like the Soviets, 
he and the rest of the Vietnamese command encouraged Cambodians to take control – or 
at least make it appear that way. This can be seen by Lam’s decision to appoint a 
Cambodian survivor, Ung Pech, as the Museum’s curator, and the Vietnamese 
installment of the PRK regime that was comprised of Cambodians that they trusted.231 
However, this created a conflicting narrative in Cambodia when the puppet PRK regime, 
supported by the Vietnamese, encouraged Cambodian victims to forgive the ex-Khmer 
Rouge so that the nation could move on.232 
Regardless of their roles as perpetrators or victims, Germans, Jews, and 
Cambodians all struggled to confront their pasts for an extended period after liberation. 
For the Holocaust this initial silence lasted for around 16 years in both Israel and in 
Germany. It is more difficult to pinpoint the exact moment in Cambodia, but it took the 
nation 27 years from the time that the Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge, 17 years 
from when the Vietnamese withdrew their troops, and only 8 years after the death of Pol 
Pot and the final collapse of the Khmer Rouge for the government to initiate the 
international tribunals. The Americans, Soviets, and Vietnamese certainly did not help 
victims and perpetrators deal with their past when they created their own narratives, 
which focused more on themselves as liberators than on anything else. However, while 
one could argue that this alone, inhibited commemoration, there were other reasons for 
these silences. 	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 The causes of silence after the Holocaust in Israel, Germany, and amongst Jewish 
victims were already analyzed above. Israelis initially struggled with the Holocaust 
because it went against the narrative of the newborn state. Germans struggled with how 
to remember their past while moving forward as a new nation. For the Jewish victims, I 
argued that silence should not be mistaken for neglect – for them, this was actually a 
period of digestion. Most Cambodians did not have the luxury to record what they had 
suffered through. The Khmer Rouge left them with nothing, and very few were given 
international help. Not to mention many were illiterate. There is no equivalent to the 
Yizkor Bikor books that survivors wrote – many stories were lost to the recess of memory. 
Holocaust silence was broken by the Eichmann trial, initiated by Israel, which opened up 
Holocaust commemoration to the public, even reaching Germany. Without Israel, 
Holocaust remembrance could still be stuck in the shadows as it was before the Eichmann 
trial. Cambodians do not have an equivalent to the Jewish homeland, nor do they have the 
same type of community in America. 
Today, Israelis fully identify with the Holocaust, but this was not always the case. 
Saul Friedlander describes how Israel initially confronted the subject in his book, 
Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe. He explains that Israel 
promoted a “catastrophe and redemption” narrative – the Holocaust was destructive and 
awful, but in the end the Jewish people persevered and from Europe’s ashes emerged a 
Jewish homeland.233 Friedlander argues that the Eichmann trial changed this perception, 
opening eyes up to the terrible, vile, and horrendous truth that so many Jews were 
murdered under the auspices of a nation. He asserts that the Holocaust “has not been 
incorporated into any compelling framework of meaning in public consciousness” 	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since.234 While Friedlander’s depressing picture of Holocaust remembrance is persuasive, 
he does not specifically address the role Israel itself played in promoting remembrance 
and commemoration. Israel’s very existence has affected the ability for Jews to confront 
the Holocaust. After the 1948 war for Independence, Israel’s existence was no longer 
being threatened so imminently, which allowed the state over time to “no longer [need] 
heroes larger than life.”235 In this way, Israel became a symbol of strength and continued 
life to world Jewry. As discussed in Chapter 1, Israelis originally saw themselves as a 
new breed of Jew, distinguished from the wretched survivors and their state as the 
antithesis of the Holocaust. Eichmann’s capture and trial in 1961 completely changed this 
perception causing Israel to take ownership and authority over Holocaust remembrance 
and commemoration and incorporating the catastrophe into its narrative. Israelis no 
longer disassociated from the Holocaust – they owned it.  
This Holocaust paradigm shift reached American Jews as well, although it did not 
culminate until sometime later. By 1993, the Holocaust dominated American Jewry by 
taking over America itself. The United States Holocaust Museum was opened in the 
nation’s capital, with 2 million visitors in its first year, while at the same time the new 
Simon Wiesenthal Centre’s Museum of Tolerance was being visited by hundreds of 
thousands of people as well.236 The Holocaust dominated Hollywood as well: “65 million 
Americans [watched Schindler’s List] when it was first shown on TV.”237 The Holocaust 
even infiltrated American literature. Elie Wiesel’s book, Night, Primo Levi’s book, 	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Survival in Auschwitz, and Art Spiegelman’s iconic comic, Maus, were being consumed 
on a massive scale by the American public by this time. Just as Israelis had, American 
Jewry became strongly associated with the Holocaust. 
Cambodians lived in Cambodia. There were no large, well-established 
populations of Khmer living abroad before the genocide. Yes, many educated 
Cambodians fled to France before the Khmer Rouge closed Cambodia’s doors, and 6,000 
Cambodians resettled in the United States, but this paled in comparison to the deeply 
rooted Jewish community in America.238 Furthermore, Cambodians had no state – like 
Israel was to the Jews, which was separated from the catastrophe enough to launch a 
memorialization on behalf of its survivors. Fleeing Cambodians ended up in refugee 
camps on the Thai border where most were either shipped back into Cambodia, given a 
visa for France, or somehow made it past America’s strict immigration laws.239 While 
European Jews had other Jews who eventually adopted their victimization and promoted 
memorialization, Cambodians were on their own. All they had were the hated 
Vietnamese that promoted their own narrative for the first 10 years of memorialization. 
Furthermore, Cambodians had to spend the first 19 years remembering the Khmer 
Rouge while they were still around and a perceived threat. How could Cambodians 
commemorate their losses when fighting was still taking place within their nation? The 
drawn out fighting and slow defeat of the Khmer Rouge left Cambodians in a state of 
perpetual warfare that stretched back from before the Khmer Rouge took power, not to 
mention that those doing the fighting against the Khmer Rouge were the Vietnamese. 
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Two enemies were fighting over who would control the country. It was not until 1998 
that Cambodians could breathe a sigh of relief.   
The allure of dark tourism is a perplexing phenomenon of human nature. Sites of 
the Holocaust and Cambodian genocides have attracted millions of tourists who visit to 
witness firsthand these places of mass murder. Tim Cole estimates that approximately six 
million tourists visit the six major Holocaust museums in the world every year; 700,000 
of these sightseers are going to Auschwitz.240 Since 1999, when Cole published his book 
Selling the Holocaust, visiting numbers have only increased. The Auschwitz-Birkenau 
Memorial and Museum reports that since 2007, over a million people began to visit 
annually; in 2015 there was a record breaking 1.7 million visitors.241  Cole recalls visiting 
Amsterdam where he waited in line at the Anne Frank house for hours as thousands of 
tourists waited patiently to climb the secret staircase into a largely empty room with no 
original décor.242 The museum’s website boasts that the house is visited by around 
1,000,000 people annually.243 The Cambodian sites are much less visited than those of 
the Holocaust, but those who visit perceive them as no less of a tourist destination. 
There are two main types of visitors: the tourist and the pilgrim. The tourist visits 
as an outsider whereas the pilgrim has some sort of emotional attachment to the place; the 
pilgrim is an insider. The overwhelming majority of visitors to the Cambodian sites are 
foreigners seeking to learn more about the genocide. As mentioned above, less than 10% 
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of the visits to the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center were by Cambodians in January of 
2015. When the Vietnamese first opened S-21 as a museum, only foreigners were 
allowed for the first 16 months.244 These figures contrast with the ratio in Auschwitz of 
foreigners to nationals. In 2015, Poles were the highest represented nationality at 
425,000. Germans ranked fourth at 93,000 and Israel came in seventh with 61,000. 245  
This contrast speaks to how important it is to visit for the nations who were directly 
victimized or who perpetrated at Auschwitz compared to the lack of importance for 
Cambodians. It also speaks to the interest of those who are not predominantly Poles, 
Germans, or Jews. The second and third most represented nationalities were the British 
and Americans respectively. 
Why are people so obsessed with death, mass destruction, and genocide? This 
question is perhaps larger than the scope of this thesis, but it is still worth some 
reflection. There is something about mass death that fascinates society. The sheer 
incompressibility of the atrocity captivates people. As one gets closer to the heart of the 
event – the killing – it becomes increasingly dark, distorted, and harder to understand. 
Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi draws a compelling metaphor to understanding the Holocaust, 
comparing it to a black hole that “consists of concentric circles, of which the gas chamber 
was the center.” No person can truly know what it was like to die in the gas chambers 
because everyone who was subjected to it was killed. The same metaphor can be drawn 
for the Cambodian genocide. It is much easier to discuss themes like how the second and 
third generations are affected – their proximity to the black hole is much further in time 
and space, whereas topics like Dr. Mengele’s experimentation on victims and prisoners’ 	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arrivals to Choeung Ek in the middle of the night are much closer to the center, and 
therefore more incomprehensible and fascinating to the outsider.  
Another reason for the popularity of dark tourism is the irresistible desire to 
witness it – to be able to say, “I Was Here.”246 When one is able to claim personal 
testimony to an event they also claim a degree of ownership and authority over it. This 
has given rise to the truly dark side of dark tourism – what Cole refers to as “selling” the 
genocide. For example, many of these sites have gift shops where visitors can take part of 
their experience home with them. For example, you can purchase a set of 10 color 
postcards that feature different parts of Auschwitz for a bargain 10 PLN, or $2.52.247 At 
Choeung Ek, visitors can choose from a variety of “small souvenir[s]” to purchase or buy 
a can of pop, ice cream, or a coconut to take with you as you weave between the 
excavated mass graves and step over bones.248 Outside of these spaces, and in the 
markets, it is impossible to not encounter merchandise like t-shirts joking about 
landmines while also running into several landmine victims in the same vicinity. When I 
was at the edge of the Choeung Ek Center, beggars would try to get pity money from 
myself and other visitors. Tourists flock to these places, and they become tourist spots in 
the eyes of the locals as well.  
Perhaps most shocking is the impact that social media has had on these sacred 
sites. The rise of the smartphone has prompted some to ask, “Should Auschwitz be a Site 
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for Selfies?”249 The same can be asked for other places of mass murder like Tuol Sleng or 
Choeung Ek. These selfies are posted to social media like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
and more where they are taken out of the sacred context and consumed by the internet-
realm of praising beauty and cracking jokes.250 The Hashtag is another perfect example of 
this. “#Auschwitz” gets over 126,000 posts where one can find the iconic picture pose on 
the train tracks leading into Birkenau, or on occasion the classic “kissy face.” 
“#tuolsleng” brings up smiling tourists standing next to survivors inside the museum and 
locals using their fingers to make the peace sign. Gift shops make money off of the 
tragedy and hashtags desensitize the sacredness of these places, but both of these aspects 
are created out of the demand from tourists to be able to take ownership and lay claim to 
their personal witness.  
Many aspects have been outlined to show how these genocides have impacted the 
world, which was done by examining the similarities and differences of the actual events 
and how they have been memorialized. Logistically speaking, the Holocaust and Killing 
Fields are starkly different. Yet, examining them together revealed major themes 
connecting them despite the disparity. In both cases leadership took advantage of culture 
in order to promulgate the killings, and the world failed to intervene until it was too late. 
These themes gave rise to identical struggles with early commemoration and confronting 
the genocide. However, a major difference in remembrance lies in the advantage that 
Jews have as being a global people. Once Israeli and American Jewry was able to adopt 
the Holocaust, after a period of struggle and digestion, it became much easier for the 
genocide to be commemorated. Israel’s Eichmann trial sparked this reversal. Cambodians 	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do not have the same type of strong identities outside of Cambodia. Furthermore, it took 
nearly two decades after the genocide before the perpetrators were decisively defeated. 
Comparing and contrasting these two genocides have shown why the Holocaust has been 
remembered so much more globally than the killing fields, but it has also revealed a 
major failure in Holocaust remembrance. The Cambodian genocide has eerily common 
themes with the Holocaust. Despite the calls to “never forget” and of “never again,” the 
overwhelming majority of the world let a second holocaust happen. By seeing the 
significant and larger similarities underneath all the differences, one can hope that this 
mistake stops being repeated. 	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Conclusion 
The Holocaust and Cambodian genocide are two very distinct events in history. 
Yet, this thesis compared the two on the premise that similarities would arise from the 
differences. This comparison creates a wider understanding of each one because it forces 
the author to think of them in the context of each other. This thesis covered a lot of 
history and two very complex topics, but it was unable to cover everything. Events as big 
and emotional as genocide are remembered in many ways. This thesis focused on public 
remembrance, and in particular, the struggle of remembering, while including some 
discussion on private memorialization. However, there are many subjects and specific 
categories that this thesis did not focus on in depth that are important aspects of how 
these genocides are remembered. Some examples are: film, art, music, literature, and 
religion. Film is a huge subject for genocide remembrance with different subcategories 
within it. There are documentaries, historical fiction, and fiction. Perhaps the most well 
known documentary on the Holocaust is Claude Lanzmann’s 10 hour film, Shoah, 
released in 1985. On the other hand, Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List, released in 
1993, is the most successful example of historical fiction film on the Holocaust. For the 
Cambodian Genocide, The Killing Fields (1984), directed by Roland Joffe, is possibly the 
most important film to watch, but there are many out there. Perhaps most unique is The 
Missing Picture (2013), directed by Rithy Panh. The film recreates the genocide using 
clay figures. This thesis also did not focus on Vann Nath’s painting of the Khmer Rouge 
period, the Holocaust art museum inside of Yad Vashem, or Him Sophy’s musical piece, 
“Memory from Darkness,” that visitors listen to at the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center. 
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These subtopics go beyond the scope of this thesis. An entire book could be written about 
these two genocides in film, art, music, literature, or religion.  
The first two chapters focused on giving a historiographical account of how the 
genocides have been remembered and commemorated over time; the first chapter 
analyzed the memorialization of the Holocaust while the second chapter did this with the 
Cambodian genocide. After examining the major themes and developments of each one, 
the third chapter conducted an in depth comparative analysis of the similarities and 
differences between the two. I found that the memorialization of these two genocides 
have encountered two overarching, remarkably similar struggles despite the fact that from 
the outset they are so starkly different. The people involved in both the Holocaust and the 
Cambodian genocide encountered shame, and the world acted in a remarkably similar 
fashion. There is also one striking difference: the Holocaust has become the icon of 
genocide, unlike the killing fields, which is hardly remembered or commemorated at all. 
For victims and perpetrators of genocide, shame is a shared emotion. It took 16 
years before the Holocaust began to be heavily memorialized in public spaces. In some 
ways, the Cambodian genocide is still struggling to do this. Most Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust only began speaking out after they had allowed time to process and digest their 
experiences. Before that, many turned to writing as a way to memorialize and remember 
what they had lost, but these memoirs were not widely circulated or printed. Likewise, 
victims of the Khmer Rouge avoided discussing their past. The subject was neglected in 
schools until recently, and the curriculum still lacks a critical study of genocide.  
The shame of the perpetrators is more obvious, and their struggles are more 
apparent. The Nazis and Khmer Rouge committed massive crimes against humanity. It 
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makes sense that afterwards those involved did not want to draw attention to what they 
did. This explains why Germany did not publicly talk about the past or teach the 
Holocaust in schools for the first 16 years. For this same reason, it also makes sense that 
Cambodians often do not know if their neighbors were perpetrators in the aftermath of 
the war – killers kept quiet. This also explains the mixed reaction, or “texture” to 
memory, that Germany so prevalently dealt with in the 80s. The Historian’s Debate in 
1985 and domestic struggle over Holocaust monuments reveals the struggle that 
Germany had between remembering the past and creating a bright future. Cambodia is 
experiencing that same struggle. Many government officials, including Prime Minister 
Hun Sen, were once part of the Khmer Rouge. Hun Sen has had a wishy-washy stance on 
public memorialization of the Killing Fields. Just like Germany struggled to incorporate 
the past with its image as a newborn nation, Cambodians are hesitant to poke at an old 
wound. 
It is eerie how the world has repeated itself in responding to and dealing with both 
genocides. In both cases, the world did not know at first that the situation would escalate 
to genocide. However, the world was not completely in the dark as to the threat that both 
the Nazis and the Khmer Rouge posed. Rather, the world powers did not care enough to 
set aside their own agenda for the welfare of others. A significant example of this leading 
up to the Holocaust was in the failure of the Evian Conference before it even began. For 
Cambodia, escaped refugees shared stories with government officials and news sources. 
Then, when Jews and Cambodians were finally liberated the Soviet Union, America, and 
Vietnamese force-fed narratives that satisfied their own agendas. Examples of this can be 
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seen in the Nuremburg trials, and the transformation of S-21 into a museum by the 
Vietnamese. 
 The world’s obsession with witnessing sites of mass destruction is yet another 
element to this second theme. Dark Tourism, or the desire for people to be able to claim a 
degree of ownership and connection to the atrocities, transforms these sacred sites into 
tourist attractions. With the rise of a more globally connected world snapshots of these 
places strip them of all sacredness and context and turn them into a unique selfie 
background or the perfect hashtag opportunity.  
 Why has the Holocaust become the icon of genocide whereas the Killing Fields 
are hardly commemorated in comparison? This thesis identified a striking difference 
between the Jewish and Khmer victims: the former are a global people while the latter are 
not. It is important to remember that it took the Eichmann trial, conducted by Israel, to 
pull Holocaust remembrance out of the shadows and into public discourse. Before the 
Eichmann trial the Israelis resisted the Holocaust and viewed victims of it as weak; in the 
eyes of Israelis, European Jewry was the antithesis of the Zionist. Israeli Jews had to 
figure out how to fit the Holocaust into their narrative of strength before they could 
identify with it. In fact, Israel itself was the symbol of strength for Jews. No such symbol 
has presented itself to the Cambodian victims. These victims had two choices: they could 
stay or try to emigrate. The latter was very difficult, and often resulted in a long-term 
hiatus in refugee border camps with awful conditions. Furthermore, the continued threat 
that the Khmer Rouge posed for 19 years after the Killing Fields added a dimension to 
the struggle of genocide commemoration. How could Cambodians stop to remember the 
death under the Khmer Rouge when they were not only still a threat, but also the 
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Vietnamese were still occupying their nation? This is another key difference between 
how and why the Holocaust and Cambodian genocides are remembered.  
 A central aim of this thesis is to expand readers’ horizons on genocide studies to 
see the benefits in comparing them. Whether the reader has an emotional attachment to 
the Holocaust or the Cambodian genocide, or if the reader is an outsider to both, it is my 
hope that this comparison sheds light on the connection between two very different 
catastrophes. No single genocide is too awful for comparison. Such thinking will lead to a 
shallow understanding of how genocides impact the people who are involved and the 
greater world.   
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